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Obtaining Monetary Redress for Consumers
Through Action by the Federal
Trade Commission*
John A. Sebert, Jr.**
. INTRODUCTION
One of the frequently cited obstacles to the Federal Trade
Commission's becoming an effective forum for the redress of
consumer grievances has been the limited nature of the remedies
available under the Federal Trade Commission Act. The Act
merely provides that, upon finding a violation of the basic prohibition against unfair methods of competition and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices,' the Commission shall order the respondent to "cease and desist from using such method of competition or such act or practice." 2 It has regularly been assumed
that this power to issue a cease and desist order does not provide
a basis for ordering a respondent to compensate any individuals
who might have been injured as a consequence of a violation of
the Act.3 In addition, it is fairly well settled that private mdividuals do not have a private cause of action for restitution,
* This Article is based upon a report prepared by the author in
his role as consultant to the National Institute for Consumer Justice.
The work on that particular report, and the work of the National Institute generally, has been funded by a grant from the Office of Economic
Opportunity. My thanks go to both organizations. The views expressed
in this Article, however, are solely those of the author and do not represent official positions of the National Institute for Consumer Justice
or of the Office of Economic Opportunity.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. I wish
to express my sincere appreciation to Larry Neilson, a second year
student at the University of Minnesota Law School, who assisted
greatly in the preparation of this study. Thanks also are due a number
of my colleagues on the faculty of the University of Minnesota Law
School who made many helpful comments on an earlier version of this
Article.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970).
3. See, e.g., Wade & Kamenshine, Restitution for Defrauded Consumers: Making the Remedy Effective through Suit by Government
Agency, 37 GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 1031, 1057-58 (1969), suggesting legislation to authorize the FTC to order restitution, but recognizing that the
Commission might have the power to order restitution under a "broad
view" of its present authority.
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damages or an injunction based upon violations of the Act.'
Thus, a merchant who violates the FTC Act faces only the possibility of an order prohibiting such conduct in the future and
runs little risk of monetary liability to those who have suffered
as a result of his deceptive practices. The only monetary liability that he might incur under the FTC Act itself is a civil penalty
of $5,000 for each violation of a final cease and desist order.
This remedial scheme, in addition to providing no redress for
injured individuals, is inadequate in that, lacking any substantial threat of monetary liability, it does not provide an effective
deterrent against even those practices which are clear and settled violations of the Act.
The unavailability of individual redress under section 5 of
the FTC Act has been recognized as a serious defect by a number of commentators 6 and by the FTC itself. During hearings
conducted in 1970 on proposed legislation to strengthen the Federal Trade Commission, Caspar Weinberger, then chairman of
the Commission, proposed that the FTC be given the authority
to award damages to consumers who have been injured by practices which the FTC finds to be in violation of the law. 7 The
chairman's recommendation was reiterated in 1971 by the present chairman, Miles W. Kirkpatrick, who described a provision
in pending legislation that would have authorized the FTC to
order redress for individual consumers as "a very keystone portion of the act .... "s
In addition to these requests for expanded legislative authority, the Commission later in 1971 took a potentially major
4. See, e.g., Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 327 F. Supp. 17

(D.D.C. 1971); Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 318 F. Supp. 785 (N.D. Cal.
1970).

5. 15 U.S.C. § 45(1) (1970).

But a violation of § 12(a) of the

FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 52(a) (1970), governing false advertising of food,

drugs or cosmetics, may in some circumstances result in the imposition

of a fine and/or imprisonment regardless of whether a final cease and

desist order had been entered or was violated. See 15 U.S.C. § 54(a)
(1970).
6. E.g., Wade & Kamenshine, supra note 3, at 1057-58; REPORT OF
THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
63-64 (1969) [hereinafter cited as ABA REPORT].
7. Hearings on H.R. 14931 before the Subcommittee on Commerce
and Finance of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 91-43, at 54-55 (1970) [hereinafter 1970

House Hearings]; see also the statement of then-Commissioner Philip
Elman, id. at 65-66.
8. Hearings on S. 986 before the Consumer Subcommittee of the

Senate Committee on Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 92-8, at 44
(1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Senate Hearings].
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step toward providing some redress for individual consumers under its existing statute. In Curtis Publishing Co.,9 the Commission found that Curtis had committed a deceptive act in violation of section 5 of the FTC Act when, after suspending publication of the Saturday Evening Post because of the magazine's
precarious financial condition, Curtis had offered subscribers
substitute magazines for the unexpired portions of their Post
subscriptions without also informing them that they were entitled to refunds if they did not wish to accept the substitute
magazines. The Commission then asserted, in an opinion by
Commissioner Paul Rand Dixon, that it had the statutory authority in certain circumstances to require a respondent to refund money or property that it had obtained from its customers
as a result of deceptive acts or practices. One such circumstance, according to Commissioner Dixon, is when restitution is
necessary to dissipate the anticompetitive effects of unlawful
conduct (such as if, as a result of deceptive acts, a respondent
received substantial monetary gains that placed him in a significantly superior financial position to competitors who did not
engage in such conduct). 1° The other major instance in which
Commissioner Dixon felt a restitution order would be justified
is when restitution is necessary to terminate an otherwise continuing unfair practice (such as if a consumer pays in advance
for goods or services that are never received or that are essentially worthless, in which case the respondent's retention of the
advance payment would constitute a continuing violation of section 5). 11

Despite these conclusions, the Commission refused to exercise the power it said it had. It declined to enter the order proposed by complaint counsel, which would have compelled Curtis
affirmatively to seek out former Post subscribers and offer them
cash refunds, and instead dismissed the complaint. The Commissioners differed, however, on the reasons for their action.
Commissioner Dixon justified the denial of restitution on the
grounds that the subscribers' rights to a refund depended on
state law. He also asserted that, in any event, Curtis' good
faith offer of substitute magazines and the fact that the money
received from subscriptions covered only a small part of the cost
of publishing the Post negated any suggestion of unjust enrich9. 3 TRADE REG. REP. %19,719 (FTC 1971) [hereinafter cited as
Curtis]. Chairman Kirkpatrick did not participate in the decision.
10. Curtis at 21,758.
11.

Id.
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ment. 12 Commissioners Dennison and Jones argued that the
Commission could take notice of the subscribers' rights to a refund under general contract law and that the retention of advance subscription payments was a continuing unfair practice
for which a restitution order would normally be an appropriate
remedy. However, they concluded that a restitution order would
not be appropriate in this particular case because Curtis' shaky
financial condition and the size of its debt to secured creditors
made it unlikely that refunds could ever be made to subscrib-

ers.' 3
The conclusion that the FTC may compel a respondent to return money or property acquired by means of an unfair practice
is not in itself totally unique. The Commission has previously
ordered respondents to return advance payments or deposits
made by purchasers when the purchased merchandise was not
delivered within a reasonable time due to the seller's fault,"' or
when purchasers induced to buy by misrepresentations found
to violate section 5 requested cancellation of their contracts.'"
The refund orders in all of these cases, however, appear to have
applied only in favor of persons who purchased after the FTC's
cease and desist orders had become final. 16 Thus, refund provisions like these are intended merely to provide for restitution in
the event of a repetition of the conduct proscribed in the basic
cease and desist order. What is new and significant about Curtis, then, is that the FTC has for the first time asserted the
power to compel a respondent to seek out and offer refunds to
persons prejudiced by respondent's actions prior to the entry of
any final FTC order. A Curtis-type refund order is intended, at
least in part, to protect individuals who incurred losses as the
result of the very actions that led to issuance of the cease and
desist order. It is this shift in focus, from protection of those
who deal with the respondent in the future to protection of
12.

Curtis at 21,760.

13.

Curtis at 21,761-62.

14. Interstate Home Equip. Co., 40 F.T.C. 260 (1945); Cookware
Associates, 40 F.T.C. 654 (1945); cf. Success Portrait Co., 35 F.T.C. 227

(1942).
15.

Windsor Distrib. Co., [1967-70 Transfer Binder] TRADE RE(.
19,157 (FTC 1970), aff'd, Windsor Distrib. Co. v. FTC, 437 F.2d
443 (3d Cir. 1971); Universal Electronics Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP.
REP.

19,575 (FTC 1971).
16. This is expressly made clear in the FTC's opinion on reconsideration in Universal Electronics Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP.
19,575
(FTC 1971). The Commission also stated that the order in Universal
Electronicswas identical to that entered in Windsor Distrib. Co.
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those who have dealt with him in the past, that has caused some
to question whether the FTC has, or should have, the power to
17
grant such a remedy.
Since Curtis, FTC hearing examiners have issued initial orders to cease and desist that required restitution in two adjudicated cases' s and there has been at least one consent order
which provided for restitution. 9 As of this writing, however,
neither of the adjudicated cases had been decided by the Commission. Thus the full Commission has not spoken further on
its newly-found power to order restitution to injured consumers. Moreover, the courts of appeal have not had an opportunity
to rule on the issue because the FTC's decision not to order refunds in Curtis resulted in the dismissal of the Curtis complaint
This Article will discuss and evaluate the existing statutory authority for Curtis-type restitution orders and, in addition, will
examine and make recommendations concerning various proposals for expanding the FTC's power to obtain monetary relief
for individual consumers.
U.

THE FTC'S POWER TO OBTAIN MONETARY REDRESS
FOR INDIVIDUALS UNDER EXISTING STATUTES

A.

THE BASIc FRAmWORK

The principal source of the Federal Trade Commission's
power with respect to consumer protection matters is section
5 (a) (1) of the FTC Act, which declares unlawful "unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in commerce .... -"20 The statutory language is,
like that of the Sherman Act, almost constitutional in breadth,
and the reports of both the Senate and the House committees
17.

See Note, The Limit of the FTC's Power to Issue Consumer

Protection Orders, 40 GEO. WAsa. L. REv. 496, 525 (1972), in which the
author rather summarily dismisses the FTC's reasoning in Curtis with
the single statement that, since restitution orders are retrospective and
compensatory, they are outside the FTC's power.
18. Universal Credit Acceptance Corp., 3 TADE Rm. RrE. 1 19,938
(FTC 1972); Credit Card Service Corp., 3

TRADE

REG. REP. % 19,967

(FTC 1972).
19. Union Mortgage Co., 37 Fed. Reg. 7787-88 (1972); cf. United
States v. Silver Star Chinchilla, Inc., 1972 Trade Cas. If 74,128 (D. Minn.
1972), a civil penalty proceeding brought for violation of an outstanding
cease and desist order in which the defendant consented to entry of a
final judgment that provided for both a $2,500 penalty payable to the
United States and a payment of $2,000 for distribution by the court to
each of 10 named complainants.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a) (1) (1970).
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when the FTC Act was passed in 1914 make crystal clear Congress' intent that the FTC have broad discretion to determine
what constitutes a violation of section 5.21 Recent decisions of
the Supreme Court also have reaffirmed the FTC's power to
proscribe practices which are unfair or deceptive to the consumer regardless of whether any adverse affect on competition
22
is shown.
In contrast to this broad power to determine substantively
what constitutes a violation of section 5, the FTC's powers to
create a remedy for a violation appear, at least at first blush,
much more circumscribed. The only formal power that the
Commission has to deal with violations is to order the respondent to "cease and desist from using such method of competition
or such act or practice. ' 23 The legislative history contains no
statements concerning the discretion of the Commission to fashion a remedy that are in any way similar to those made about its
power to determine substantive violations. Little weight has
been attached to that omission, however, largely because the
enforcement provisions of the FTC Act received little attention
during the extensive floor debates. Those who supported the
bill accepted the enforcement provisions with little comment,
and those who opposed the bill concentrated their attack on the
substantive provisions of section 5, particularly the broad authority granted the FTC to determine what constitutes an unfair
method of competition. 24 Thus the legislative history concerning the scope of the FTC's cease and desist power is at best
sketchy and inconclusive.
The case supporting remedial innovations by the FTC, such
21. See H.R. REP. No. 1142, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1914); S.
REP. No. 597, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914). There was no indication of
any intent to change that grant of broad discretion when, in the WheelerLea Act of 1938, Act of March 21, 1938, c.49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111, what is
now section 5(a) (1) of the Act was amended to read essentially as it
now does by adding "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce" to the original proscription against unfair methods of competition.

22. See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson, 405 U.S. 233 (1972); cf. FTC
v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 320-21 (1966).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970).

24. See Kauper, Cease and Desist: The History, Effect and Scope
of Clayton Act Orders of the Federal Trade Commission, 66 MiCH. L. Rsv.

1095, 1102 (1968). That article contains an exhaustive review of FTC
orders under the Clayton Act and also discusses in some detail the leg-

islative history of the enforcement provisions of the FTC Act.

What

discussion there was in 1914 concerning enforcement powers focused
primarily on the FTC's inability to impose "sanctions." E.g. 51 CoNG.
REc. 12,145; 12,652; 14,932 (1914).
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as that undertaken in Curtis, finds its greatest support in a long

line of decisions by both the Supreme Court and the courts of
appeal that have established a general principle of judicial deference to the FTC's choice of remedy, a deference that approaches that accorded the FTC's determination that a particular
practice violates section 5. Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC2 5 is the case
most frequently cited for the proposition that the FTC, as the
administrative agency with the expertise and responsibility to
enforce the FTC Act, has broad discretion in its choice of remedy. The Court there considered an FTC order banning the use
of the trade name "Alpacuna" for respondent's coats, the FTC
having found the trade name deceptive because the coats in fact
contained no vicuna. Although it eventually remanded the case
to the FTC for reconsideration because the Commission had not
explored other, less drastic, remedial alternatives before prohibiting the use of the valuable trade name, the Court made the
following broad statement concerning the FTC's remedial powers:
The Commission is the expert body to determine what remedy
is necessary to eliminate the unfair or deceptive trade practices
which have been disclosed. It has wide latitude for judgment
and the courts will not interfere except where the remedy selected has
no reasonable relation to the unlawful practices found
26
to exist.
In a subsequent case, the Court repeated the Siegel test and
stated that the issue on review of the FTC's chosen remedy had
been narrowed to the question: "Does the remedy selected have
2
a 'reasonable relation to the unlawful practices found to exist'?
Thus a reviewing court cannot merely substitute its judgment
28
for that of the FTC in the matter of remedies.
Although these broad propositions are of limited utility in
resolving a specific case, they are indicative of the general judicial attitude toward FTC orders. There have been relatively
few instances in which an FTC order under section 5 has been
overturned on the ground that the remedy chosen by the FTC
was entirely unauthorized by the Act.2 9 Those few cases in which
25. 327 U.S. 608 (1946).
26. 327 U.S. 608, 612-13 (1946).
27. FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 429 (1957), citing
Siegel; see also FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952); FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
28. See Waltham Watch Co. v. FTC, 318 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1963);
Carter Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1951).
29. See Comment, Permissible Scope of Cease and Desist Orders:
Legislation and Adjudication by the FTC, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 706, 710-11
(1962).
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the FTC's chosen remedies have been overturned have largely
been cases, like Siegel, in which the court decided that the FTC
did not give sufficient consideration to less drastic remedies than
the one it chose.3 0 Nonetheless, the FTC's good track record
in having its orders upheld on appeal does not necessarily mean
that restitution orders will be upheld, for, until recently, the
FTC has not been notably innovative in fashioning remedies.
Most FTC orders have been relatively traditional in nature,
merely prohibiting the respondent from repeating in the future
acts similar to those it was found to have committed in the past.
The bulk of the cases upholding FTC orders and emphasizing
the agency's "wide latitude" in fashioning a remedy have involved such traditional orders, sustaining them against claims
31
that the orders were too broad in scope.
Concentrating solely on the broad issue of whether the Commission's order has "some reasonable relation to the unlawful
practices" found to have existed, a restitution order in a case
like Curtis appears sustainable. It will be recalled that Commissioners Dennison and Jones concluded that the precise unfair
practice in Curtis was retention of the advance subscription payments when the Post had ceased publication. 32 Such an unfair
practice can be deemed a continuing one, and it does not seem
unreasonable to conclude that one way to assure that the practice
cease is to require Curtis to offer refunds to its subscribers.
Thus the "reasonable relation" test appears to be met.
There are, however, other asserted limitations upon the
30. See, e.g., Magnaflo Co. v. FTC, 343 F.2d 318 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Elliot Knitwear, Inc. v. FTC, 266 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1959).

31. Many of the "wide latitude" pronouncements have appeared
in cases holding only that the FTC may prohibit practices other than
the precise ones that respondent had previously committed and that

even otherwise lawful practices may be banned if necessary to assure
that the effects of prior illegal acts are dissipated or that such acts are
not effectively continued in a different form.

See, e.g., FTC v. National

Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419 (1957); FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470
(1952); S & S Pharmaceutical Co. v. FTC, 408 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1969).

On the permissible scope and breadth of FTC orders generally, see 1 K.
DAVIS, ADMINIsTRATIVE LAW § 8.19 (1958, Supp. 1970); L. JAFFE, JuDIcIAL

CONTROL

OF ADmINISTRATIVE

ACTION ch. 8

(1965) [hereinafter cited

as L. JAFFE]. Kauper, supra note 24, in a study focusing primarily upon
Clayton Act orders issued by the FTC, concludes that reviewing courts
have been far too willing to defer to the FTC's discretion in choosing a
remedy, resulting in judicial approval of orders that are unnecessarily
broad and vague. Such criticisms relating to the scope and precision
of FTC orders, however, are not very relevant to the problem of
whether the statute authorizes a restitution order.
32. Curtis,supra note 9, at 21,762.
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FTC's power to frame a remedy, some of which may present more
substantial difficulties with respect to the propriety of a restitution order. The hearing examiner in Curtis, who held that there
was no authority for a restitution order, asserted that the FTC
lacked the power to require affirmative action by a respondent.3 3
It might be further asserted that a restitution order violates
the principle that the FTC may not provide remedies for essentially private wrongs. 34 It is also generally recognized that the
FTC has no power to impose "penalties" for violation of the
Act,3 5 and the hearing examiner viewed the restitution order in
Curtis as a penalty.3 6 Finally, a restitution order might be
viewed as operating retrospectively, thus violating the maxim

(closely intertwined with the prohibition against penalties) that
FTC orders may operate only prospectively.37 The remainder of
this portion of the Article will be devoted to an analysis of the
above objections to a restitution order.
B. OBJECTIO S To RESTITUTION ORDERS
1.

Affirmative Action

The contention that restitution orders are improper because
the FTC lacks the authority to compel any affirmative action on
the part of a respondent is wholly without merit. It has been
clear for years that the FTC's authority to issue cease and desist
orders is not limited to the issuance of prohibitory injunctions.
Essentially mandatory injunctions requiring a respondent to undertake specific acts in the future regularly have been upheld
in the courts.3 8 The numerous advertising disclosure cases, in
which the FTC has required a respondent to include various
statements in future advertising in order to cure deception found
to exist in past ads, are important examples of affirmative requirements imposed by the FTC.39 The FTC has also successCurtis Pub. Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 19,376 (FTC 1970) (initial
to cease and desist).
See FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19 (1929).
See FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952).
19,376 (FTC 1970) (initial
36. Curtis Pub. Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP.

33.
decision
34.
35.

decision to cease and desist).
37. See, e.g., FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 706 (1948);
Eugene Dietzgen Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 321, 331 (7th Cir. 1941); Regina
Corp. v. FTC, 322 F.2d 765 (3d Cir. 1963).
38.

See Auerbach, The Federal Trade Commission:

Internal Or-

ganization and Procedure, 48 MmN. L. REv. 383, 511-12 (1964).
39.

E.g., J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir.), order

modified, 72 F.T.C. 865 (1967), affirming in all but one minor respect
an FTC order requiring respondent to disclose in its advertising for
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fully required compulsory licensing of drug patents that had
40
been used in violation of section 5 of the FTC Act.

One type of affirmative order closely analogous to a restitution order is an antitrust divestiture order. 41 Section 11(b) of
the Clayton Act, which the FTC also enforces, expressly authorizes divestiture as a remedy for violation of that Act. 42

The

FTC Act contains no express mention of divestiture, however,
and the Supreme Court once held that the FTC had no authority
to order divestiture as a remedy for anticompetitive practices
Geritol that, in most instances, fatigue is not caused by iron deficiency
that could be cured by Geritol. See also ITT Continental Baking Co.,
36 Fed. Reg. 18,522 (1971), a consent order requiring respondent to include in 25% of its advertising a statement that Profile bread is not
effective for reducing weight.
In some recent complaints, the FTC has sought a different form of
affirmative advertising disclosure: a statement that the FTC had found
claims in prior advertising for the product to have been deceptive. The
principal example of such an attempt is the attack on the vitamin C
content claims made for Hi-C drink. 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1 19,351 (FTC
1970) (complaint). The administrative law judge recently filed an
initial decision to dismiss, having found that the Hi-C advertising was
not deceptive. 3 TRADE REG. REP.
20,108 (FTC 1972). The current

controversy over corrective advertising orders in general, and particularly Hi-C type orders requiring disclosure that the FTC had found past
advertising deceptive, is discussed in three recent student comments:
72 COLUM. L. Rrv. 415 (1972); 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 496 (1972); 85

HAuv. L. Rsv. 477 (1971).

Because of J.B. Williams Co. and other cases approving affirmative
action requirements, it seems unlikely that these orders will be at-

tacked successfully merely because they require some affirmative ac-

tion. See All-State Industries of North Carolina, Inc. v. FTC, 423 F.2d
423 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970) (affirming an FTC

order requiring disclosure to customers that their installment sales con-

tracts might be assigned to third parties with a resulting loss of defenses against the assignee); Portwood v. FTC, 418 F.2d 419 (10th Cir.

1969) (affirming an FTC order requiring a mail order company to inform mailees that they are under no duty to return or preserve unsolicited merchandise, and that they have no duty to pay for the merchandise unless they decide to purchase it).
It appears from Siegel (see supra notes 25-27, infra note 59, and accompanying text) that the cease and desist power extends only to actions
reasonably necessary to prevent the continuation of unfair practices,
or to dissipate the effects of past practices. From this, it can be argued
that the permissible objectives can be met by advertising statements
that merely correct the substantive misconceptions fostered by prior ads
(e.g., "Hi-C really does not contain as much vitamin C as orange juice")
without the additional and stigmatizing statement that the FTC had
formally determined the prior ads to have been deceptive.
40. See American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir.
1966).

41. Both require respondent to disgorge benefits acquired through
violations of the Act.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 21(b) (1970).
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that violated only section 5 of the FTC Act, stating that the FTC
4
had only those remedial powers expressly granted by the Act.

3

That early decision has proven somewhat of an aberration and
was essentially laid to rest in Pan American World Airways, Inc.
v. United States.44 The Court there held that the Civil Aeronautics Board, under a statute that authorized only the issuance
of cease and desist orders and that was patterned after section 5
of the FTC Act, did have the authority to order divestiture as a
remedy for unfair methods of competition. The Court has since
stated that its early decision denying the FTC divestiture power
has been rejected,4 5 and an FTC order requiring divestiture in a
section 5 case has recently been upheld by a court of appeals."0
Thus the advertising disclosure cases and, particularly, the divestiture cases make entirely untenable the contention that restitution orders are improper because they require affirmative action.
2. Remedies for PrivateWrongs
Justice Brandeis once stated, in FTC v. Klesner,7 that the
FTC Act "does not provide private persons with an administrative remedy for private wrongs. ' 48

It is obvious from a read-

ing of Klesner, however, that the actual limitation on the FTC's
power is not nearly as broad as the maxim. The FTC had ordered Klesner to cease using the name "Shade Shop" for his
business, a name which he had adopted for the express purpose
of ruining the business of one Sammons, who also operated a
"Shade Shop" and with whom Klesner had had a business dispute. The Court considered the FTC without authority to act
in the matter and reversed. But the reversal was not based on
the fact that Sammons would benefit directly from the FTC's
order. Rather, the decision was based on what is now section
5(b) of the FTC Act, which provides that, before issuing a complaint, the Commission must find that a proceeding by it would
43. FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619 (1926).
44. 371 U.S. 296 (1963). See also Gilbertville Trucking Co. v.
United States, 371 U.S. 115 (1962), holding that § 5(4) of the Interstate
Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 5(4), which empowers the Interstate Commerce Commission to take whatever action is necessary to prevent continuance of violations, authorizes the ICC to order divestiture.
45. FTC v. Dean Foods, Inc., 384 U.S. 597, 606 n.4 (1966).
46. L. G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1971); see also
Golden Grain Macaroni Co., 3 TRAD.REG.REP. j 19,521 (FTC 1971).
47. 280 U.S. 19 (1929).
48. 280 U.S. 19, 25 (1929).
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The Court emphasized

the absence of any evidence that Klesner's product was inferior
to Sammons' or that the consuming public had suffered, and
concluded that the required showing of a "specific and substantial" public interest in the proceeding had not been made. 0 But
if the requisite public interest had been present, Justice Brandeis
appeared to recognize that the FTC could have acted, and that
some 'direct benefit to a specific individual such as Sammons
might be permissible as an appropriate "incident" to protection
5
of the public at large. '
There have been very few cases since Klesner in which an
FTC order has been overturned for failure to demonstrate the
requisite public interest in the proceeding. But in those cases
in which the requisite public interest was deemed lacking, the
reviewing courts have always emphasized the Commission's failure to show any substantial or meaningful injury to the public
arising from the respondent's supposedly deceptive practices. 2
Moreover, at least one respected court has expressly stated that
although the FTC's determination of the existence of a "public
interest" is reviewable, strong deference should be given to that
determination. It felt that only the FTC had the information
and experience to decide whether action in a particular case will
serve to promote the general objective of attaining higher standards of business conduct.5 3 The minimal nature of the restraint
actually imposed upon the FTC by the public interest requirement is also demonstrated by the trivial nature of many of the
unfair trade practices that the FTC has successfully attacked in
54
the past.
49. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970).
50.

280 U.S. 19, 28-9 (1929).

Justice Brandeis also stressed the

fact that Klesner had used the supposedly deceptive trade name for 5
years before the FTC issued its complaint.
51. 280 U.S. 19, 25 (1929).
52. See, e.g., Burton-Dixie Corp. v. FTC, 240 F.2d 166 (7th Cir.
1957); Flynn & Emrich Co. v. FTC, 52 F.2d 836 (4th Cir. 1931).
53. Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295 F.2d 869, 873-74 (2d Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 917 (1962).

54. Professor Posner, one of the sharpest critics of the FTC's actions in the 1960's, examined the more than 200 consumer fraud orders
issued by the Commission in fiscal 1963. He concluded that 40 per cent
of those orders involved "no fraud worthy of the name," and that, in
another 40 per cent, if there was any fraud involved, the problems
should have been handled by private legal remedies, rather than by
FTC action entailing an unnecessary expenditure of public funds. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. Cm. L. Rsv. 47, 71-77 (1969).
Although one may disagree with Professor Posner's precise figures, it
is clear that the FTC has taken action, without any significant judicial
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It must again be emphasized that the statutorfly-required
determination of a "public interest" must be made at the time
a complaint is issued. Thus the question primarily is whether
any action by the FTC in the matter would be in the public interest. Once the respondent's acts are shown to have prejudiced,
or to have the potential for prejudicing, even a relatively small
portion of the consuming public, the applicable public interest
standard appears to be met, and the fact that the FTC's order
may particularly benefit a few individuals will not deprive the
FTC of its power to act. 55 Assuming, then, that a respondent's
practices have affected a substantial part of the public (which
certainly seems to have been the case in Curtis"0 ), an order for
restitution that is necessary either to restore the competitive
status quo or to prevent the continuance of an unfair practice
(in Curtis, the continued refusal to make refunds that were due)
appears to meet any applicable public interest standard.
3.

Penalties and the Prospective/Retrospective Distinction

The most serious challenge to FTC orders requiring restitution is based on the generally accepted principle that FTC orders
57
may not be "punitive" or "retrospective" in their application.
Despite frequent repetition of this principle, there is little guidance to be found in the opinions of either the FTC or the reviewing courts as to what actually constitutes an impermissible penalty or retrospective order since, in almost all of the cases involving alleged punitive or retrospective aspects of FTC orders,
the remedy selected has eventually been upheld.ss It is my contention that the so-called punitive and retrospective limitations
on FTC orders should be viewed essentially as a stylized way of
repeating, with a negative rather than a positive focus, the "reasonable relation" test enunciated in Siegel. The thrust of Siegel
is that the FTC may select any remedy that is reasonably related
to the basic statutory purpose of preventing the continuation or
restraint being imposed through the public interest requirement, in many
cases where the practices being attacked were of marginal or no general
significance. See generally, ABA REPORT, supranote 6.
55. See E.B. Muller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944),
holding that the substantial benefit that one company would gain by an
FTC order prohibiting the company's only other two competitors from
conspiring to eliminate competition did not prevent the Commission
from acting.
56. In May 1968, the Post's circulation was about 7% million.
Curtis,supra note 9, at 21, 755.
57. See cases cited at notes 35 &37 supra.
58. Id.
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recurrence of an unfair practice.59 But it may do no more. And
any Commission order that attempts to do more, any order that
is not reasonably necessary to eliminate the unfair practice in
question, is likely to be deemed "punitive" or "retrospective" and
thus impermissible.
One source of the proposition that FTC orders may not be
punitive is the numerous statements made during the floor debates by proponents of the original FTC Act that the FTC would
be unable to impose "sanctions". 60 These statements about sanctions, however, invariably referred to the inability of the proposed FTC to impose fines or imprisonment for violations of the
0 2
Act, 61 sanctions which the Act expressly leaves to the courts.
Other possible sanctions, such as the awarding of damages or
restitution, do not appear to have been much discussed. It has
regularly been assumed since that time, however, that the FTC's
cease and desist powers are not broad enough to encompass the
award of compensatory damages to persons injured as a result
of a respondent's violation of the FTC Act.6 3 Although the Supreme Court has never spoken expressly to the FTC's power to
award compensatory damages, it has stated that the Civil Aeronautics Board, which operates under a statute similar in many
important respects to section 5 of the FTC Act, has no power to
award compensatory damages. 64 That conclusion seems equally
59.

See text accompanying note 26 supra.

60. E.g., 51 CONG. REC. 12,145, 12,652, 14,932 (1914).
61. See particularly the remarks of Senator Cummins, 51 CONG.
REC. 12,652 (1914).

62. Federal district courts may impose a civil penalty of up to
$5,000 a day for violation of a final order, 15 U.S.C. § 45(1) (1970),
and may in some circumstances punish a defendant found guilty of false
advertising of food, drugs or cosmetics by a fine of up to $5,000
and/or imprisonment for up to 6 months.

15 U.S.C. § 54(a)

(1970).

Legislation passed by the Senate in 1971 (but which died for lack of
House action) would have authorized the FTC to bring civil actions in
the federal district courts to collect civil penalties of no more than
$10,000 for any violation of section 5(a) (1) of the FTC Act if the defendant knew, or could be "fairly implied" to have known, that he was
violating the Act. See S. 986, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 202, as reported in
S. REP. No. 92-269, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1971).
63. See, e.g., the statement of FTC Chairman Weinberger in 1970
House Hearings,supra note 7, at 54-55.
64. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S.
296, 311 (1963). One of the few federal administrative agencies with
the power to award damages is the Interstate Commerce Commission,
which can compel a carrier found to have violated the Interstate Commerce Act to pay damages to any persons injured by the violation.
See 49 U.S.C. § 16(1) (1970). The fact that the ICC expressly possessed this power when the FTC Act was passed in 1914 and that similar
language was not included in the FTC Act lends some additional support
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applicable to the FTC and is consistent with the proposition that
an FTC-imposed remedy may be only so great as is reasonably
necessary to prevent the continuation or recurrence of an unfair
practice. The only apparent relationship between an award of
compensatory damages for past violations and the permissible
statutory purpose of preventing the continuation or recurrence
of an unfair practice is that the prospect of a damage award
might deter future violations. A more specific nexus than that
must be shown if the limitation on the FTC's power is to have
any meaning at all.
Though a compensatory damage award is impermissible, an
order for restitution of money or property acquired by a respondent through an unfair practice is arguably a far different
matter. In contract law, compensatory damages and restitution
are considered distinctly different remedies. The former is intended to place the plaintiff in as good a position as if the contract had been performed, while the latter is intended only to
reverse unjust enrichment and restore the status quo by requiring the defendant to disgorge only those benefits he had directly received from the plaintiff. 65 Thus restitution is frequently available in situations in which compensatory damages
are not.68 In the normal sense of the word, then, a restitution
order cannot be said to be a disguised award of compensatory
damages. Nor should restitution be considered punitive. A penalty normally connotes a payment required irrespective of or
in addition to any actual loss incurred, 7 whereas a restitution
order would merely return to injured persons money or property of theirs that respondent had improperly retained. Restitutionary remedies in similar contexts have been upheld against
charges that the remedies were punitive.6 8
to the proposition that the FTC is not authorized to award compensatory
damages.
65. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 326 and comment (b),
§ 329 (1932); REsTATEAMENT oF REsTrTUTON § 1, comment (e) (1937).
66. Restitution is available, for example, to a person who has conferred benefits upon another in the performance of a contract that is
void because of lack of agreement, lack of consideration, incapacity of
one of the parties, or similar reasons. See REsTATENMNT or RESTITUTION
§ 47 (1937).
67. See, e.g., the civil penalty provisions of the FTC Act cited
at note 62 supra.
68. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d
Cir. 1971); see also Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S.
288, 293 (1960), in which the Court rejected the contention that an order
for payment of unpaid minimum wages to employees who had been
discriminatorily discharged was "punitive" and thus outside the juris-
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The fact that the FTC is empowered to order divestiture as
a remedy for anticompetitive practices that violate section 5 of
the FTC Act 69 provides some of the strongest support for the
view that a restitution order in a case such as Curtis is authorized and is not improperly "retrospective". Both restitution and
divestiture orders are retrospective in that they are based upon
past acts and, in fact, are intended to require the undoing of past
acts and the restoration of the status quo. Divestiture is upheld
because it may be the only effective remedy to ensure that unfair trade practices will not continue in the future or that the
anticompetitive effects of past unfair practices have been neutralized. 70 A similar argument may be made in favor of restitution in a case like Curtis. Since the unfair practice found in
Curtis was the retention of advance subscription payments after
the Post suspended publication without offering subscribers refunds, the restitution order can be viewed as an effective and
appropriate means of ensuring the discontinuance of the violation (the improper retention of advance subscription payments).
It might be argued, however, that divestiture is different
from restitution in two important respects, and that these differences justify upholding the former remedy and rejecting the
latter. First, a restitution order operates in favor of a particular
class of persons (in Curtis, the former subscribers) and thus is
for their benefit and arguably not "in the public interest". This
argument has been discussed previously, and it was concluded
that once respondent's practices are shown to have affected a
substantial part of the public, an order for restitution to a specified class of individuals would not violate the public interest
71

requirement.

Second, a divestiture order is seemingly less prejudicial to
the respondent because the previously acquired business presumably can be sold on the market for fair value, thus providing
the respondent the opportunity to reduce or minimize out-ofpocket losses. However, a respondent subject to a restitition order is not in a significantly less favorable position. If the respondent has provided goods or services to individuals entitled
to restitution under an FTC order, the respondent normally
diction of a court of equity. For a more complete discussion of De Mario,
see text accompanying notes 74-81 infra.
69. See notes 41-46 supra and accompanying text.
70. See L. G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1, 23 (7th Cir. 1971);
cf. Gilbertville Trucking Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 115, 129 (1962).

71.

See notes 52-56 supra and accompanying text.
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would be entitled to the return of the goods, or to offset the
value of the goods or services against its restitution liability. 72
If, on the other hand, the respondent has not provided goods
or services of any value, he can hardly complain at having to
return money or property obtained in return for nothing (or
for the promise of nothing). Thus, from the standpoint of potential prejudice to the respondent, divestiture and restitution
orders do not appear significantly different.7 8
Another line of cases that might provide some support for
the FTC's power to grant restitution are those upholding the
authority of a federal executive or administrative agency to obtain restitution for individuals in federal court proceedings
brought under statutes that, by their terms, only authorize the
agency to obtain an injunction. The first of these cases was
Porter v. Warner Holding Co.,74 a case involving World War 11
price controls in which the price administrator sought not only
an injunction against violation of the Act but also an order requiring that the excessive rents previously charged be refunded
to the tenants involved. The Supreme Court held that such a
restitution order was permissible under the Act on two grounds.
First, the Court relied in part on statutory language that authorized the district courts to grant an injunction "or other order" at the request of the Administrator. 7 5 Second, the statutory authorization of an injunction was viewed as effectively invoking all of the traditional equitable powers of the district
court, including the power to grant restitution.7" Until 1960,
however, Porter tended to be viewed as an aberrational wartime
decision or, at best, as dependent on the unique "other order"
language of the Price Control Act.77 Thus the rule announced
72. See Wade & Kamenshine, Restitution for Defrauded Consum-

ers: Making the Remedy Effective Through Suit by Government Agency,

37 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1031, 1041-42, 1056 (1969), and authorities cited
therein.
73. In the case of both divestiture and restitution, respondent stands
to lose the administrative costs incurred in the initial transaction and
in completing the subsequent divestiture or restitution
74. 328 U.S. 395 (1946).
75. 328 U.S. 395, 399 (1946). The statute involved was § 205(a)
of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Act of Jan. 30, 1942, c.26,
Title II, § 205(a), 56 Stat. 23, 33.
76. 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946). To the effect that restitution is traditionally an equitable remedy, see United States v. Carter, 197 F.2d
903 (10th Cir. 1952); Leesburg State Bank v. Lyle, 99 Fla. 535, 126 So.
791 (1930).
77. See United States v. Parkinson, 240 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1956),
refusing to permit the Food and Drug Administration to obtain restitution for defrauded consumers in an action brought to enjoin the market-
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in Porter was not widely applied to actions by other federal
agencies.
This situation changed in 1960, when the Supreme Court
held that the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which authorized the district courts to restrain violations of the Act at the request of the Secretary of Labor, also authorized the Secretary to
obtain, in the same action, reimbursement to employees of wages
they lost as a result of discharges unlawful under the Act.1 8
The Court reaffirmed the correctness of Porter and made it clear
that the decision did not necessarily depend on the peculiar language of the statute. It concluded that when Congress granted
the district courts power to enjoin violations of the FLSA, it
must have been aware of the "historic power of equity" to provide complete relief and that, absent a clear prohibition in the
statute, the full range of equitable powers would attach to the
extent necessary to effectuate the purposes of the statute. 9
In
recent years restitution has been allowed on a similar theory in
suits brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission under
the securities acts" and by the Secretary of Labor under the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act."'
Although the principle announced in Porter is extremely
useful in supporting the authority of government agencies to obtain restitution for consumers in some circumstances, its value
in support of administrative restitution orders by the FTC is
rather limited. The real basis of Porter and its progeny is twofold. First, the federal district courts already possessed general
equitable jurisdiction8 2 and, second, a government agency seeking an injunction in such a court is invoking the entire equitable
jurisdiction of the court, including the traditional equitable
power to order restitution. The problem with applying this theory to actions of an administrative agency like the FTC, then,
is that the FTC does not possess any broad grant of equitable
ing of misbranded drugs under what is now § 332 (a) of the Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 332(a) (1970).
78. Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960).

For an excellent discussion of Porter, Parkinson and De Mario, see
Wade & Kamenshine, supra note 72.
79. 361 U.S. 288, 291-92 (1960).
80. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971);
SEC v. Wong, 252 F. Supp. 608 (D.P.R. 1966); see Comment, 65 Micn.
L. Rsv. 947 (1967).
81. Wirtz v. Independent Workers Union of Florida, 272 F. Supp.
31 (M.D. Fla. 1967), interpreting § 401 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 481 (1970).
82. See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946).

19721

FTC MONETARY REDRESS

jurisdiction similar to that of the federal district courts. The
FTC's enforcement power arises solely from its section 5 power
to order a respondent to cease and desist. While there is broad
language in some judicial and agency opinions analogizing the
remedial powers of administrative agencies to those of an equity
court,8 3 those statements largely compare administrative agency
powers with the powers of equity courts to frame injunctive decrees and not with other equitable powers, such as the granting
of restitution.8 4 Thus one cannot really make the argument that
is central in Porter apply to the FTC-that is, one cannot say
that Congress, in granting the FTC the power to issue a cease
and desist order, was granting that power to an agency which it
knew already independently possessed a broad range of equitable powers.8 5
One federal agency that clearly does have the authority administratively to order individual redress, and which might provide a useful analogy in evaluating the FTC's claimed power to
order restitution, is the National Labor Relations Board. The
Labor Board has long been considered authorized to order the
hiring or reinstatement of an employee who was discriminatorily
denied employment or fired, and the Board's order in such a case
may include an award of back pay to the employee.8 0 Recently,
it has also been held that the Labor Board has the power to order
an employer who has refused to bargain with a union in violation of section 8(a) (5) of the NLRA8 7 to "make his employees
whole" by paying them amounts based on the Board's assessment
of the contract terms to which the union and employer would
have agreed had the employer bargained in good faith.8 8
83. E.g., Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371
U.S. 296, 312 n.17 (1963); Ecko Products Co., 65 F.T.C. 1163, 1212-15
(1964).
84. See Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371
U.S. 296, 312 n.17 (1963).
85. The Porter line of decisions is extremely useful, however, to a
state attorney general who wants to argue that a statute authorizing
him to obtain an injunction against an unfair trade practice also authorizes restitution to defrauded consumers.
86. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941). Such
a back pay award is arguably more punitive to the employer than a
Curtis-type restitution order, since the employer must pay the wages
without having received the services. The punitive aspects are lessened, however, by the requirement that the employee's interim earnings and any losses wilfully incurred (e.g., by unexcused failure to obtain substitute employment) be deducted from the award.
87. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1970).
88. International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers
v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 1243 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, Tidee Prods., Inc. v.
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In a sense, the Labor Board's statutory authority for back
pay and "make whole" awards is more substantial than that of
the FTC: section 10(c) of the NLRA authorizes the Board not
only to order a respondent to cease and desist from violations
of the NLRA, but also to "take such affirmative action, including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay,
as will effectuate the policies of this [Act].""" This language
clearly authorizes back pay awards, and the express authorization of affirmative action has been relied upon to support "make
whole" awards. 90 If, however, the basis of these "make whole"
awards is merely the Labor Board's express statutory authority
to issue affirmative orders, as opposed to traditionally negative
cease and desist orders, the Labor Board's authority in that respect is not substantially greater than the FTC's. It has long
been clear, as indicated previously, that the FTC's statutory authority to issue cease and desist orders also encompasses the
authority to issue affirmative orders necessary to effectuate the
broad policies of the FTC Act.9 1
Nonetheless, the express mention of back pay awards in the
NLRA does provide express evidence of a Congressional intent
that the Labor Board's "affirmative action" should include requiring compensation to individuals for losses incurred as a result of past violations of the NLRA. It might be argued that the
FTC lacks the power to order a respondent to make restitution
because the FTC Act lacks any similar expression of an intent
to provide compensation for past violations. But while the FTC
Act admittedly contains no such express evidence of an intent
International Union, 400 U.S. 950 (1970). The Labor Board subsequently
disagreed with the D.C. Circuit and concluded that it lacked the power
to issue such a "make-whole" order, in part because such an order would
violate the prohibition in section 8 (d) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (d)
(1970), against compelling either party to agree to a specific proposal.
Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. No. 20, 74 L.R.R.M. 1740 (1970); cf. H.K.
Porter, Inc. v. NLRB 397 U.S. 99 (1970). On review, the D.C. Circuit
agreed that a make-whole order was not appropriate in Ex-Cell-O because the employer's refusal to bargain was there based on a good
faith assertion of fairly debatable objections to the union's designation
as the bargaining representative. Nevertheless, the court reiterated its
belief that the NLRB could issue make-whole orders in appropriate circumstances.

Ex-Cell-O Corp. v. NLRB, 449 F.2d 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

For a detailed discussion of make-whole remedies in which the author
concludes that such remedies are within the power of the NLRB, see
St. Antoine, A Touchstone for Labor Board Remedies, 14 WAYNE L. REV.
1039 (1968).
89.

29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970).

90. International Union v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 1243, 1248-49 (D.C.
Cir. 1970).

91.

See notes 38-46 supra and accompanying text.
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to authorize compensation, FTC restitution orders also do not
go nearly as far as NLRB back pay or "make whole" orders.
They do not amount to the award of compensatory damages,
as the NLRB orders do. 92 Moreover, the restitution orders so
far issued by the Trade Commission have been designed to prevent continuing violations of the FTC Act in the form of continuing retention by the respondent of payments to which he was
not entitled.9 3 Such restitution orders, being intended at least
in part to prevent continuing violations, could be sustained under the basic "cease and desist" provisions of the FTC Act, even
without any express indication, such as there is in the NLRA,
of a Congressional intent to authorize the award of compensation for losses incurred as a result of past violations of the Act
C. SCOPE OF TE FTC's RESTITUTION AuTHoRrT
A very strong argument can be made for the proposition that

the FTC indeed does presently possess the statutory authority to
order a respondent to make restitution to past victims of his

unfair or deceptive practices, at least in some circumstances.
That argument, as discussed in the preceeding pages, is based
upon (1) the FTC's basic cease and desist authority, (2) the traditionally wide latitude that appellate courts have given the
FTC in fashioning remedies for violations of section 5, (3) analogies to the divestiture power that the FTC clearly has under
section 5 and (4) some of the remedies, especially "make-whole"
orders, that have been held authorized under the National Labor
Relations Act. The only argument of any substance that can be
raised against restitution orders generally is the assertion that
such orders are essentially punitive and retrospective in that
they attempt to provide a remedy for past violations rather than
to prevent future ones. Even that argument fails, however, in
a situation such as that presented in Curtis, where the respondent retained advance subscription payments after discontinuing
publication of the magazine. Retention of these advance payments without returning the value for which the payments were
made may reasonably be deemed a continuing unfair practice in
92. See notes 63-66 supra and accompanying text for a discussion
of restitution and compensatory damages.
93. FTC restitution orders are distinguishable from NLRB '"nakewhole" orders in another important respect. An order for restitution of
money or property does not raise the potentially substantial problem of
speculativeness necessarily involved when the Labor Board must base an
award on its estimate of what contract terms the parties would have
agreed to had there been good faith collective bargaining.
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violation of section 5. Once that conclusion is reached, a restitution order may easily be supported as a remedy that has an
eminently reasonable relation to the permissible purpose of preventing the continuance or recurrence of a violation of the Act.
A restitution order is obviously not an appropriate or permissible remedy for every violation of section 5. Under the
Siegel test, the FTC's chosen remedy must be reasonably related
to preventing the continuation or recurrence of an unfair practice.9 4 In order to meet that test and survive attacks based upon
the prohibition against punitive or retrospective remedies, restitution orders may have to be limited to situations in which it can
fairly be said that retention of the money or property by the
respondent amounts to a continuing violation of the FTC ActY5
The easiest situations in which to support a restitution order
are therefore those in which the respondent has never delivered
the goods or services for which value has been paid90 or in which
the respondent's unfair practices have deceived purchasers into
paying value for goods or services that are essentially worth97
less.

The restitution remedy is also easiest to administer in these
situations. Restitution implies returning both parties to the
status quo that existed prior to the transaction. Thus any party
seeking restitution normally must return to the other party the
specific thing that he received in the transaction 98 or, in some
94. See text accompanying notes 26-27, 59 supra.
95. In Curtis, supra note 9, at 21,757-58, Commissioner Dixon suggested that restitution to consumers also would be appropriate if necessary to dissipate anticompetitive effects of unlawful conduct. However,
if the respondent's continued retention of consumer money or property
were not unfair to consumers as well as to competitors, the consumers
would receive a windfall if the respondent were ordered to make restitution to them. Because of this, it seems highly unlikely that restitution to consumers would be ordered unless the respondent's retention
of the consumer's money or property were unfair to those consumers.
Thus the possibility of competitive injury to competitors does not provide much of a basis for restitution to consumers.
96. Cf. Cookware Associates, 40 F.T.C. 654 (1945), in which respondents were found to have continued to accept advance payments
for aluminum cookware despite wartime restrictions on the civilian use
of aluminum, and to have then offered substitute cookware or promised
aluminum cookware at some indefinite future date.
97. See, e.g., Credit Card Service Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 19,967
(FTC 1972), ordering a respondent engaged in offering insurance against
losses arising from lost or stolen credit cards to make refunds to persons
who bought the service after the effective date of federal legislation
limiting a cardholder's liability for lost or stolen cards to $50, since
respondent did not advise its customers of this legislation.
98. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 65-67 (1937).
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cases where specific restoration is impossible, must at least return the value of what he received 99 Assuring the required
specific restoration or determining the value of the benefit conferred by the respondent to be used as an offset to the restitution award can often present some difficult problems. But when
the respondent has not performed at all or has rendered an essentially worthless performance, the problems associated with
restoring the respondent to the status quo are minimized.10 0
Although the FTC's opinion in Curtis states only that restitution would be an appropriate remedy in cases of non-performance or an essentially worthless performance,' 0 ' the underlying
principle of that decision logically extends to a far broader class
of cases. That principle seems to be that an unfair trade practice is a continuing one if it results in a respondent retaining
consumer payments that substantially exceed the value of the
performance rendered. Logically, then, there would be a continuing unfair trade practice, with restitution as a permissible
remedy, in any case in which misrepresentations of the quality
or characteristics of respondent's goods or services resulted in the
payment by consumers of a price that substantially exceeded the
value of the goods or services. This would be true even if the
performance actually rendered did have substantial value.
Under this broader view of Curtis, restitution could be considered a permissible remedy in a relatively significant portion
of the Commission's deceptive practice cases. To appreciate the
potential reach of this doctrine, one merely has to examine some
of the types of practices that the FTC previously has found unfair. It has been held unfair, for example, to represent old or
used merchandise as new; 0 2 to misrepresent the durability of a
product; 103 to advertise prices as "discount" when they are in
99. See id. § 66 and comment d.
100. A restitution order in such a case should involve few major
difficulties and should in fact almost be self-executing-the respondent
could be ordered to make full refunds to all customers who had not
received the promised performance. The FTC or its administrative law
judge probably would not have to make any determination as to the
entitlement of a specific individual unless a dispute arose during implementation of the order. Restitution orders in such cases would be
based largely on the respondent's own records and would involve no
more difficulty than do back pay orders regularly issued by the NLRB.
101. Curtis at 21,758.
102. E.g., Double Eagle Lubricants, Inc. v. FTC, 360 F.2d 268 (10th
Cir. 1965); Parliament T.V. Tube Sales, Inc., 59 F.T.C. 127 (1960) (consent).
103. E.g., Continental Wax Corp. v. FTC, 330 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964).
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fact higher than the prevailing market price for the product; 0 4
or to imply that a patent medicine will cure a particular symptom when, in most instances, it will not.10 In all of these cases,
it may well have been possible to have established that the respondent's misrepresentations about his product caused consumers to pay substantially more than its actual value. The logical
implication of Curtis in such situations is that the respondent's
retention of the difference between the value paid and the actual
value of his performance would have amounted to a continuing
unfair trade practice, and that restitution of that difference
would have been a permissible remedy under the FTC Act.
Such a result would be consistent with generally existing private rights under state law, where rescission and restitution are
normally available in the event of material misrepresentations,
even if innocent. 10 6
In this situation, where a respondent has rendered performance of some substantial value, the difficulties of administering
mass restitution through an FTC order could become quite substantial. One of the complicating factors is the slowness of FTC
proceedings, which may result in a restitution order coming, if
at all, years after the events complained of. 1° 7 Such a delay
would often mean that, if the transaction involves goods, rescission could not be effected merely by ordering the respondent to
take back the goods and refund the price, since the goods would
not be returned in as good a condition as when they were purchased. Thus, in order to establish the restitution award in such
cases, the FTC would have to determine the precise value of the
performance rendered by the respondent and offset that value
against the payments received by the respondent.
When respondent has rendered performance of some substantial value, there also are some potentially difficult problems involving the reliance and materiality that normally are
prerequisites to restitution in misrepresentation cases.' 08 To
104. E.g., Leon A. Tashof, [1967-70 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP. f 18,606 (FTC 1968), af'd 437 F.2d 707 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
105.

E.g., the celebrated case of "Geritol," J.B. Williams Co., 68

F.T.C. 481 (1965), aff'd in all but one respect, 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir.
1967), order modified, 72 F.T.C. 865 (1967).
106. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION,
OF CONTRACTS § 476 (1932).

§ 28 (1937);

RESTATEMENT

107. See note 117 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of
delay in FTC proceedings.
108. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 476 (1932), stating that a
transaction is voidable for material misrepresentation or fraud only if
the party was induced to enter the transaction by such misrepresentations or fraud.
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justify a restitution order, the FTC should have to find that the
unfair or deceptive practice involved was material and did contribute to the respondent's acquiring or retaining the money or
property that is to be returned by the restitution order. Otherwise, an order compelling restitution to a person to whom respondent's alleged violations were not significant may represent a windfall not justified by any of the policies of the FTC
Act. Where the respondent has not performed at all, or where
his performance has been essentially worthless, it is not difficult to conclude that, since his customers presumably paid their
money in the expectation of receiving something of substantial
value, the reliance and materiality requirements have been met.
But if the respondent has rendered performance of substantial
value and the section 5 violation involves alleged misrepresentations about the quality and characteristics of that performance,
the determination of materiality and reliance is at least more
difficult.1 0 9
Although it obviously will be more difficult to formulate
and administer a restitution order when a respondent has in
fact rendered a performance of some substantial value than
when the performance, if any, has been worthless, it is not suggested that the FTC's restitution authority is, or should be, limited to the latter class of easy cases. The logic of Curtis extends
equally to cases where valuable performances have been rendered, and the Commission should feel free to order restitution
in these cases where appropriate. I feel strongly, however, that
the potential "administrative" difficulties associated with crediting a respondent with the value of his performance, and with
determining materiality and reliance, should be weighed carefully when the decision of whether or not to seek a restitution
order is made. I shall discuss in the next section a number of
other factors that, in my view, should also be considered in
reaching that decision.
Before beginning that discussion, however, it is important
to recognize that there are many types of deceptive practices for
109. Reliance and materiality are intimately tied together. See
§ 479 (1932), stating that when the misrepresentation is material it is presumed to have induced the transaction absent facts showing the contrary. Cf. Urom CommcicLL
CODE § 2-313, Comment 3, dealing with whether a seller's affirmation
of fact amounts to an express warranty and stating that once an affirmation has been made, "clear affirmative proof' is required to prevent the statement from being considered part of the "basis of the bargain" and thus an express warranty.
RESTATmEMNT OF CoN~TAcTs
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which restitution would not be a permissible remedy. This is so
because in many situations a respondent will not have received
or retained payments substantially exceeding the value of his
performance, even though he acted improperly. Restitution is
therefore unlikely when the unfair practice in question does not
affect the quality or value of respondent's goods or services. For
example, "bait and switch" sales tactics-"baiting" customers
with low-priced advertised specials and then "switching" them
to higher priced goods by disparaging or refusing to sell the lowpriced items-are improper.110 Restitution theoretically could
be justified in such a case if it were shown that the bait and
switch tactics led a customer to buy an item he otherwise would
not have purchased. But the requirement of returning the respondent to the status quo normally would mean that restitution could be ordered only if the price paid for the high-priced
item substantially exceeded the value of that item."'
Even if the deceptive practice relates directly to the quality
of a respondent's performance, such as a misrepresentation of the
attributes of his product, restitution often would not be available. The misrepresentation, when considered in full context,
might not be material, thus negativing the inference that customers purchased in reliance upon it. Absent such a showing
of reliance, restitution would not be justified. 1 1 2 One example
of such a situation might be the infamous "Rapid Shave" case,
in which the FTC found deceptive a television commercial that
attempted to demonstrate Rapid Shave's moisturizing qualities
by a mock-up purporting to show that sand could be shaved off
sandpaper to which Rapid Shave had been applied. 13 One might
well question whether the deception in this case was significant
enough to warrant any attention by the FTC. But assuming a
prospective cease and desist order was warranted, it still would
have been quite difficult to show that the deception was so material that substantial purchases were made in reliance upon the
deceptive commercial.
110.

See, e.g., Better Living, Inc. v. FTC, 259 F.2d 271

(3d Cir.

1958); see generally FTC Guides Against Bait Advertising, 16 C.F.R.
§ 238 (1972).
111. The assumption is that merely returning the item to the respondent for a refund of the price would not suffice, since the item
would likely be consumed or not in nearly as good a condition as when
purchased by the time the FTC acted.
112. See notes 108-09 supra and accompanying text.
113. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 59 F.T.C. 1452 (1961), rev'd and remanded, 310 F.2d 89 (1st Cir. 1962), modified, 62 F.T.C. 1269 (1963),
rev'd, 326 F.2d 517 (1st Cir. 1963), enforced, 380 U.S. 374 (1965).
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The need to show that the customer paid substantially more
than the value of the goods or services received would also present a substantial obstacle to entry of a restitution order in the
Rapid Shave case and in many other cases where the practices
being attacked are exaggerated product claims. Such claims are
often made in an attempt to differentiate a product that otherwise is similar in price and quality to competing products. If
this is the case, and if customers do not pay more for Rapid
Shave than they would for other products of similar quality,
differential to be returned
then there would be no price-value
11 4
through a restitution order.

D.

GuiELNES FOR THE

EXERCISE OF DISCRETION

If, as suggested, restitution may be a permissible remedy for
a relatively broad range of FTC Act violations-such as all violations that result in a respondent retaining payments that substantially exceed the value of his performance-this newly-found
restitution remedy has the potential of causing major changes
at the FTC. Not all of those changes would necessarily be salutary, however, for widespread use of restitution orders would
entail substantial costs for the FTC. High among those costs
would be the additional time and resources that would have to
be devoted to potentially complicated determinations of materiality, reliance and value that have not heretofore been central
to the FTC's activities.
Another potential cost inherent in the increased use of restitution orders is that it may be significantly more difficult to
get a respondent to consent to an order containing a restitution
provision than to a more traditional cease and desist order. The
direct and immediate monetary consequences of a restitution order may well lead many respondents to insist on litigating a
restitution order, at least through the initial hearing stage, even
though they might otherwise have consented to a traditional
order. Thus widespread use of restitution orders by the FTC
might well reverse the recent trend toward consent rather than
contested orders.11 5 Admittedly, this trend away from contested
114. The customers' expectations of superior quality might be frustrated, but those expectations generally are not compensated in a restitution action. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTAmCS § 347 and comment b
(1932).
115. In fiscal 1969, the last year for which a breakdown between

consent and contested orders is available, the FTC's Bureau of Decep-

tive Practices issued 65 complaints: 54 were consented to and only 11

were contested. In fiscal 1967, by contrast, 40 of 108 complaints were
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orders may not be entirely salutary. Obtaining orders by consent is not always a goal to be sought, and an unusually large
preponderance of consent orders may indicate that the agency
is not being innovative enough or is not attacking practices of
116
sufficient importance.
On the other hand, a consent order has one immense advantage over a contested order-the delay between issuance of
a complaint and issuance of a final order, which may amount to
17
a period of three to five years, is reduced almost to zero.
Thus, in some cases, it may appear that insistence on restitution
as part of a proposed order would make the difference between
an immediate consent order and a protracted contested case.
The FTC must then decide whether the benefits of a restitution
order (which would fall largely to the individual consumers who
have dealt with the respondent in the past) would outweigh the
benefits of an immediately effective but entirely "prospective"
cease and desist order (which would at least prevent any more
persons from being injured by respondent's acts).tls
These costs and the limited resources available to the FTC
make it extremely unlikely that restitution could be sought in
all, or even a very large portion, of the cases in which restitution
might, under a logical extension of Curtis, be permissible. To
contested, and 68 were consented to. See ABA REPORT, supra note 6,
at 20.
116. Id. Witness the extremely high percentage of consent orders

reported for textile and fur matters.
117. The three to five year estimate is referred to in Eovaldi &
Gestrin, Justice for Consumers: The Mechanisms of Redress, 66 N.W.U.L.
REv. 281, 299 (1971), citing Weston, Deceptive Advertising and the Federal Trade Commission: Decline of Caveat Emptor, 24 FED. COM. B. J.
548, 561 (1964). The ABA Commission reported that, in fiscal 1969,
81% of the deceptive practices complaints pending before the FTC were
under two years old, and the remaining 19% were two to four years old.
ABA REPORT, supra note 6, at 31. The ABA Commission's figures,
however, do not reflect the additional delay incurred before an FTC
order becomes final if a respondent decides to seek judicial review.
Thus despite substantial improvement in reducing the backlog of deceptive practice complaints during the 1960's (in fiscal 1963, for example, 28% of the deceptive practice complaints before the FTC were two
to four years old, and 4% were four to six years old, ABA REPORT, supra
note 6, at 31), the three to five year estimate still may not be too far off.
118. Of course, the prospect of a restitution order does minimize one
previously important incentive that a respondent had to contest an FTC
order and thus delay its final imposition. The respondent is no longer
assured of being able to continue to profit from his unfair or deceptive
practice during the pendency of the FTC proceeding and any subsequent judicial review. But additional consumers will continue to be

deceived during that period, and even if a restitution order is finally
issued, will be repaid only after a substantial delay.
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attempt to do so might seriously impair the FTC's historic and
still primary role of establishing standards for future conduct in
the marketplace by diverting substantial resources from traditional cease and desist activities. In order to avoid such an unhappy result, the FTC must view restitution as truly ancillary
to its primary prophylactic functions. In each instance in which
restitution is a potentially permissible remedy, the FTC must
consider the individual case in the context of overall FTC enforcement policies in order to make a sound determination on the
propriety of a restitution order. When that determination is
made, the following factors deserve particular consideration, although it certainly is not contended that they represent an exclusive listing:
1. Nature of the offense. One of the principal advantages
of restitution orders from the FTC's point of view is that they
may provide an additional and very useful deterrent against
FTC Act violations. But a sanction can act as a deterrent only
if the substantive standards are well known. In order to maximize the deterrent effect, then, it would seem that restitution
orders should be used primarily against acts or practices that are
clear violations of settled principles under section 5.*11 Restitution, if otherwise appropriate, might be particularly justified as
a remedy for acts that violate existing FTC Trade Regulation
Rules. 120 By concentrating on clear violations, the FTC also
would minimize the likelihood of imposing substantial monetary
liability upon a respondent who believed in good faith that he
was complying with the law.
2. Seriousness of the offense. Involved here would be a
somewhat subjective judgment concerning the nature and effect
of the acts challenged. In part, the focus would be on the mate119. A somewhat similar approach has been adopted by the D.C.
Circuit with respect to '!make-whole" remedies for a refusal to bargain
in good faith under the National Labor Relations Act. In Ex-Cell-O
Corp. v. NLRB, 449 F.2d 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the court decided that,
although the employer had violated his duty to bargain in good faith,
a make-whole remedy was not appropriate because the employer's refusal to bargain was based upon an assertion of fairly debatable objections to the union's designation as the bargaining representative. For
a general discussion of NLRB make-whole remedies and their relationship to restitution orders, see notes 86-93 supra and accompanying text.
120. There presently is some uncertainty about the authority of the
FTC to issue rules that have the effect of substantive law. See note 239
infra. Even if this issue is resolved against the FTC, it presumably still
could issue guidelines listing types of violations that it felt were quite
clear and for which restitution would ordinarily be considered an appropriate remedy.
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riality of the acts and the likelihood of prejudice to those who
have dealt with the respondent. 1 2 1 More than the actual impact
on a respondent's customers should be considered, however. It
may well be that certain classes of offenses would be viewed as
serious enough, without regard to the consumer's purely monetary injury, that restitution should normally be sought, again
122
largely in an attempt to deter such offenses.
3. The victims. As a general rule, the public interest in
obtaining restitution will be greater as the class of potential
beneficiaries of a restitution order increases. Thus the more
widespread the respondent's practices have been, the more reasonable it will be for the Commission to conclude that whatever
additional time and effort is involved in obtaining restitution is
justified. 23 On the other hand, there may be situations in which
the size of the potential class of beneficiaries is so great as to
make restitution unmanageable.12 4 In any case, sheer size of
the potential class ought not be conclusive. The Commission
also can and should consider more qualitative characteristics of
the class of potential beneficiaries. If the respondent has dealt
largely with low income consumers, for example, the Commission might well be justified in seeking a restitution order more
readily, on the ground that such individuals might be less able
and less likely to assert whatever private rights they might have
in either individual or class actions.
4. Amount of individual loss. As a general matter, the
larger the average individual loss suffered as a result of a respondent's unfair practices, the more serious the injury and the
more reason for the FTC to seek restitution. There may be
some situations, of course, in which the size of the individual loss
combined with the type of consumers affected may make it
likely that the consumers will seek redress through private ac121. The standard of materiality necessary to justify a prospective
cease and desist order may be substantially lower than that necessary
to justify imposition of direct monetary liability in a mass restitution
action. See notes 112-13 supra and accompanying text.
122. One possible example of such an offense might be false advertising of drugs. Evidence of a stronger Congressional policy against
such offenses can be found in the fact that civil penalties may in some
circumstances be imposed for initial violations. See note 5 supra.
123. In Curtis, for example, the proposed restitution order might
have benefitted as many as 71/ million former subscribers of the Saturday Evening Post. See Curtis,supra note 9, at 21,755.
124. This would be particularly true if the FTC had to make individual determinations of materiality, reliance, and of the value of the
respondent's performance.
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tions under state law. The likelihood of such private actions,
and whether such actions would essentially be duplicated by an
FTC restitution order, should weigh in the FTC's determination
of whether to require restitution in its order.
5. Anticompetitive effects of respondent's unfair acts. It
was previously suggested that the anticompetitive effects of respondent's unfair acts normally would not alone justify restitution to consumers. 125 But if restitution to consumers is otherwise an appropriate remedy, the FTC should be more willing to
undertake the effort to order restitution if the respondent's retention of consumer payments would give him a significant and
unfair advantage over his competitors.
6. Effect on the respondent. Mass restitution through an
FTC order could have a disasterous effect upon a respondent,
possibly precipitating bankruptcy, or at least seriously crippling
the respondent. This is a factor that the FTC should consider,
as it did in Curtis, in deciding whether to order restitution. 2 0
But obviously the FTC should not always refrain from action
merely because of potential damage to the respondent. Rather,
the effect of a restitution order on the respondent must be considered in light of other factors, particularly the nature and
seriousness of the offense and the degree of prejudice to the consuming public.
7. Difficulties of proof and administration. If the respondent has partially performed and rendered benefits of some substantial value to his customers, a restitution order involves potential difficulties in determining materiality and reliance and
in assuring specific restoration of those benefits to the respondent or crediting him with the value of his performance.1 2 7 These
difficulties suggest that stronger independent reasons for seeking restitution should be required when the respondent has rendered a performance of substantial value than when he either
has not performed at all or has rendered an essentially worthless performance.
125. See note 95 supra.
126. The reason that Commissioners Dennison and Jones gave for
denying restitution was not only that it probably would cause bankruptcy, but also that subscribers would likely have obtained nothing in a
bankruptcy distribution because all of Curtis' assets probably would
have been depleted in satisfying prior secured claims. See note 13
supra and accompanying text. The recommendation here, however, is
that the FTC consider the potential effect of a restitution order upon a
respondent even if it is likely that substantial amounts actually could
be recovered for consumers.
127. See notes 98-100, 107-09 supra and accompanying text.
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8. Delay. As suggested above, if the decision to seek a
restitution remedy is likely to make the difference between a
protracted contested case and a relatively quick and inexpensive
consent order, the relative benefits of those two results, both in
the particular case and in the overall enforcement context, must
12 8
be carefully weighed.
9. FTC resources. The limited resources that the FTC has
available for national enforcement of the FTC Act and a multitude of other statutes 1 29 is obviously a primary reason underlying the necessity for exercising sound judgment in deciding
whether or not to seek a restitution order, just as it underlies
the need for sound judgment in deciding initially whether to
issue a complaint. The specific factors that have just been suggested as relevant to the determination of whether or not to
seek a restitution order are intended primarily as aids toward
the ultimate goal of the most rational and effective use of the
FTC's limited resources. But the effective use of resources deserves specific mention by itself, if only for emphasis.
III.
A.

PROPOSALS FOR STATUTORY CHANGE

THE 92d CONGRESS

"I believe that doubts as to the extent of our remedial
powers have too frequently required us to stop short of completely fulfilling our responsibility to the consumer." Miles W.
Kirkpatrick, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission. 180
This statement by Chairman Kirkpatrick illustrates one of
the important underpinnings of the legislative proposals that
have been made in recent sessions of Congress to revise the remedial provisions of the FTC Act. These proposals, however,
have generally gone substantially beyond mere attempts to provide express statutory authority for remedies, such as restitution orders, that the FTC is arguably already empowered to use
under its existing statute.
The legislative proposal that would have had the most farreaching effect upon the remedial powers of the FTC itself was
128. See note 118 supra and accompanying text.
129. E.g., Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-65
(Supp. 1972); fair packaging and labeling, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-61 (1970);

Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1970); fabrics & textile matters, 15 U.S.C. 68-70, 1191-1204 (1970).
130. Statement made March 9, 1971, during the Senate hearings on
legislation to expand the powers of the Federal Trade Commission,
1971 Senate Hearings,supra note 8, at 35.
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S. 986.131 As originally introduced early in 1971, that bill would
have empowered the FTC to order any respondent who had
committed a violation of Section 5(a) (1) of the Act that was
"unfair or deceptive to consumers" to "take any other action
necessary to redress the injury caused by such acts or practices
to consumers."' 1 2 This broad language would have permitted
the Commission to order the payment of restitution or compensatory damages to an injured consumer, and might even have
supported an order requiring specific performance. Shortly
thereafter, and apparently before full committee consideration,
the section dealing with the FTC's remedial powers was revised.
The revised version authorized the Commission to order further
actions that it deemed reasonable and appropriate to remedy
injury to consumers, expressly mentioning rescission, refund of
money and return of property. Curiously enough, no express
mention was made of the award of damages. The revised version also provided that the FTC's decision as to the reasonableness and appropriateness of such additional remedies was subject to de novo review by the courts of appeal 33
The power to award compensatory damages in an FTC proceeding was sought in 1970 by Caspar Weinberger, then Chairman of the FTC,134 and the consumer redress provisions of S.
986 were supported by Chairman Kirkpatrick in 1971.135 Both
industry and the administration opposed granting the FTC the
power to order redress for individual consumers. They argued
that the standards for liability under the FTC Act are too vague
to support any type of relief other than a purely prospective
cease and desist order 1 36 and that FTC procedures, being sub131. 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (as introduced, Feb. 25, 1971)
[hereinafter cited as S. 986 (original)).
132. S. 986 (original), § 202; see also id. § 203. Other provisions of
Title II of this bill, not directly relevant to the present discussion, would
have expanded the FTC's jurisdiction to cover acts and practices "affecting commerce" rather than just those "in commerce" (§ 201); authorized the FTC to seek preliminary injunctions against unfair or deceptive practices in some circumstances § 212) and to obtain civil
penalties of up to $10,000 for "knowing" violations of the FTC Act itself,
instead of only for violations of outstanding cease and desist orders
§ 202); and would have clearly granted the FTC power to make "legislative" rules § 208). Title I of S. 986 dealt with consumer product
warranties and would have, inter alia, established federal minimum
standards for such warranties.
133. See S. REP. No. 92-269, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1971).
134. 1970 House Hearings,supra note 7, at 54-55.
135. 1971 Senate Hearings,supra note 8, at 44.
136. See letter of William N. Letson, General Counsel, Dep't of
Commerce, in S. REP. No. 92-269, supranote 133, at 54.
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stantially different from those of a court of law, are not adequate to protect the respondent if direct monetary liability is
to be imposed.

18 7

Having heard this opposition, the Senate Commerce Committee further revised S. 986's provision for consumer redress by
deleting the authority to grant individual redress in an FTC order itself. A new provision was substituted which would authorize the FTC to institute civil actions in the federal courts
to obtain redress for consumers injured by a respondent's deceptive acts or practices. The specific provision reported out by the
Senate Commerce Committee is as follows:
After an order of the Commission to cease and desist from
engaging in acts or practices which are unfair or deceptive to
consumers and proscribed by section 5(a) (1) of this Act has
become final...,

the Commission, by any of its attorneys

designated by it for such purpose, may institute civil actions
in the district courts of the United States to obtain such
relief as the court shall find necessary to redress injury to consumers caused by the acts or practices which were the subject of
the cease and desist order, including but not limited to, rescision
[sic] or reformation of contracts, the refund of money or the return of property, public notification of the violation, and the
payment of damages. 138
It should be noted that the Committee version specifically authorizes the FTC to obtain money damages for injured consumers and permits the FTC to use its own attorneys rather than be
represented in court by the Justice Department, as is the normal
practice. The Committee version also provides that the FTC
may seek court redress for consumers only after an FTC cease
and desist order against the defendant covering the practices in
question has become final.
In November, 1971, the Senate passed S. 986 by a vote of
76-2.139 The only change from the consumer redress provision
137. See statement of Richard McLaren, Assistant Attorney General,
1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 225; letter of William N. Letson,
S. REP. No. 92-269, supra note 133, at 54; see also statement of Gilbert
Wel, 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 79-80; memorandum from
National Association of Food Chains, id. at 193; text following note 150
infra.

138. S. 986, § 203 in S. REP. No. 92-269, supra note 133 at 37-38.
This section is very similar to a provision that the Senate Commerce
committee had reported favorably to the Senate late in the 91st Congress, except that S. 986 limits the FTC's power to seek judicial redress
to cases in which the FTC has obtained a final cease and desist order.
See S. 3201, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 103 (1970), reprinted in S. REP. No.
91-1124, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1970). No floor action was taken on
S.3201.
139.

117 CONG. REc. 17,887 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1971).
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reported by the Committee was the addition of a statute of limitations-the FTC must institute an action for consumer redress
within two years after the FTC order on which the action is
based has become final 140 Despite this relatively early Senate
passage, the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce did not report out either S. 986 or any of its House companion bills, and thus the bill died without House action when
the Congress adjourned in October 1972.
The Senate Committee report does not reveal why the committee rejected the original proposal to permit FTC orders themselves to require the payment of damages or to grant other individual consumer redress. It is doubtful that this change was in
response to the previously-mentioned administration and industry complaints that the FTC Act was too vague to justify imposition of other than purely prospective sanctions. 14 1 Under the
Committee proposal, the FTC could not institute an action until
after it had entered a final cease and desist order; once it had
obtained such a final order, however, it clearly could seek damages from the defendant for consumer injuries caused prior to
entry of the order or even prior to the issuance of a complaint
by the FTC.. 42 Moreover, the claim that standards of liability
under the FTC Act are too vague is seriously exaggerated. Despite the generality of the statutory language, there has developed an extensive body of FTC and judicial decisions that identify with relative clarity many types of practices that are prohibited by the FTC Act. 143 It is not unreasonable to assume
that FTC consumer redress suits under the proposed statute
would be brought primarily against such clearly prohibited practices. 1 4

4

The other major industry and administration criticism of
the original version-that FTC procedures are not presently adequate to protect a respondent if monetary liability is to be directly imposed by the FTC145 -may have carried more weight
140. The provision for a two year statute of limitations was added
as a result of a floor amendment offered by Senator Spong, who initially proposed § 203 in committee. See 117 CONG. REc. 17,875 (daily
ed. Nov. 8,1971).
141. See text following note 135 supra.
142. See S. 986, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 203 (1971) (as enacted by
Senate). Hereinafter the version of S. 986 passed by the Senate will be
cited: S. 986 (Senate version).
143. See, e.g., the practices mentioned in the text accompanying
notes 102-04 supra. Guidance may also be obtained from FTC rules
and guides, such as the Guides Against Bait Advertising, supra note 110.
144. See notes 119-20 supra and accompanying text.
145. See text following note 135 supra.
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with the committee. Some based their criticism in this regard on
constitutional grounds, arguing that the constitutionally-protected right to a jury trial 146 in common law actions involving
over twenty dollars would be violated if the FTC were empowered to award compensatory damages in its administrative proceedings. 147 That constitutional argument appears unlikely to
prevail. The Supreme Court has already held that the seventh
amendment's jury trial guarantee does not apply to back pay
awards of the Labor Board, on the grounds that the award of
such damages was incidental to equitable relief (an order to
cease and desist from discriminatory firings) and that the proceedings were statutory and did not exist at common law. 148
The award of damages by the FTC in a section 5 proceeding
appears to be a quite similar case. The damage award would
be incidental relief in a proceeding involving historically equitable relief (a cease and desist order), and the proceeding would
be for the purpose of enforcing statutorily-created rights (derived from section 5's prohibition against unfair and deceptive
trade practices) that did not exist at common law.' 49 Thus as
long as the award of damages by the FTC is an integral part of
its enforcement activities under the comprehensive statutory
scheme that is committed to the FTC, there seems to be little
likelihood that the jury trial guarantee of the seventh amendment would be held applicable. 150
The claim that FTC procedures are not adequate to insure
procedural fairness if direct monetary liability is to be imposed
146.

U.S. CONST. amend. VII.

147. See memorandum from National Assn. of Food Chains, 1971

Senate Hearings,supra note 8, at 193.
148. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
149. Cf. Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 291
Ill. 167, 125 N.E. 748 (1919); Walters v. Blackledge, 220 Miss. 485, 71
So. 2d 433 (1954), upholding the administrative award of damages under state workmen's compensation statutes against challenges based
upon state constitutional jury trial guarantees. These cases and the
general problem of the jury trial guarantee and relief in administrative
proceedings are discussed in L. JAFFE, supra note 31, at 90-91, 98-99.
150. Some additional support for the proposed award of damages by
the FTC may be found in the long-standing power of the Interstate

Commerce Commission to order a carrier who has violated provisions
of the Interstate Commerce Act to make refunds or pay damages to
persons injured thereby. 49 U.S.C. §§ 8, 16(1) (1970). In a subsequent
proceeding to enforce such an award, however, the ICC order has only
It has been held
prima facie effect. See 49 U.S.C. § 16(2) (1970).
that such prima facie effect insulates the statutory scheme from attacks
based on the right to a jury trial. See note 212 infra and authorities
cited therein.
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may be based on the lack of separation of investigatory, prosecutory and adjudicatory functions in the FTC. The alleged unfairness of combining these functions in one agency has been the
subject of extended debate over the years, 5" and this is not the
place to attempt to resolve, or even to delve very deeply into,
that debate. It does seem, however, that the award of restitution or compensatory damages is not significantly more prejudicial to a respondent than are other types of remedies frequently
granted by the FTC, such as orders banning the use of a valuable
trade name,152 or compelling divestiture, 153 or requiring "corrective" advertising. 154 Unless the present combination of functions is to be altered with respect to all, or at least most, actions
presently under the jurisdiction of the FTC, the alleged unfairness of combining prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions in
one agency does not, of itself, justify denying the FTC the additional power to award compensatory damages.
However, there may be other considerations which, combined with this debate about the fairness of FTC procedures,
provide a basis for preferring the federal courts to the FTC as
the forum for granting direct consumer redress such as damages.
These considerations will be dealt with later.'r5 First, consideration will be given to some difficulties that might be encountered under the bill that the Senate did approve, which would
have authorized the FTC to sue in federal court for damages and
other direct redress on behalf of injured consumers.
B.
1.

AwALYSis OF THE SENATE PROVISION

Relation to FTC Refund Orders

As passed by the Senate, the consumer redress provision of
S. 986 would have expressly authorized the FTC to institute federal court actions to obtain, inter alia, "recision [sic] or reforma151. See, e.g., Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent
Regulatory Commissions, 69 YALE L.J. 931 (1960); and Minow, Suggestions for Improvement of the Administrative Process, 15 AD. L. Rlv. 146
(1963), suggesting that the adjudicatory functions of the CAB and the
FCC, respectively, be assigned to separate administrative courts; but see
W. CARY, PoLrrics

AND

THE REGULATORY AGENCIES 125-34 (1967), in which

the former chairman of the SEC criticizes the Hector-Minow proposals
for separating the administrative and adjudicatory functions.
152. E.g., FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934). See also
textual discussion of Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC following note 25 supra.
19,521
153. E.g., Golden Grain Macaroni Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP.
(FTC 1971). See text accompanying notes 41-46 supra.
154. E.g., J. B. Williams Co., Inc. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967).
155. See notes 224-25 infra and accompanying text.
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tion of contracts, the refund of money or return of property,
public notification of the violation, and payment of damages
..
,"156 The specific reference to authority to seek court-ordered rescission and refund of money and property immediately
raises the question of the effect of this section, if enacted, upon
the professed authority of the FTC to order a respondent to
make refunds of money or property in certain circumstances. 15 7
There is language in the report of the Senate Commerce Committee that may have been intended to resolve this question.
Regarding section 203, the Committee stated:
This section would not affect whatever power the Commission may have under section 5 to fashion relief in its initial
cease-and-desist order, such as corrective advertising or any
other remedy, which may be appropriate to terminate effectively
unfair or deceptive acts or practices. Section 203 is applicable
to those situations where the Commission acts to make specific
consumers whole and not to general actions designed to dissipate the prior effects of unfair or deceptive acts or practices. 158
It will be recalled that one of the principal instances in
which the FTC in Curtis considered a refund order appropriate
was when the retention of money or property by the respondent
was itself a continuing unfair practice, which a refund order
would effectively terminate.1 5 9 Thus the first sentence of the
above extract could indicate a committee intent not to disturb
the result in Curtis (although not endorsing that result either).
On the other hand, the only FTC remedy that the committee expressly mentioned as one it did not intend to disturb was corrective advertising. This fact, taken together with the additional
statement that section 203 applies "where the Commission acts
to make specific consumers whole", could be read to indicate
that any action seeking specific consumer redress (including
merely a refund) must come under the judicial relief provisions of section 203. The earlier statement about not disturbing
the Commission's existing authority to grant relief necessary to
terminate unfair or deceptive practices would thus be viewed
as applying only to "prospective" relief ordered by the FTC for
the benefit of the public at large, such as corrective advertising
necessary to dissipate misconceptions about a product's qualities
caused by previous deceptive advertising.
Absent further evidence, however, speculation about the
156.

S. 986, § 203 (Senate version).

157. See Curtis, supra note 9; see generally part II of this report,
supra.
158. S. REP. No. 92-269, supra note 133, at 25.
159. Curtis,supra note 9, at 21,758.
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Committee's or the Senate's intent with respect to FTC refund
orders is not very useful.100 In fact, it is entirely plausible that,
when the report was written, the Committee did not know that
the FTC claimed the power to order refunds and therefore had
not expressly considered the possible difficulties of meshing section 203 with FTC refund orders. For the Committee report
was dated July 16, 1971, and there is no reference anywhere in
it to refund orders or to Curtis, which was decided only slightly
over two weeks earlier, on June 30, 1971.
Nonetheless, the emergence of restitution orders under Curtis does create a potential ambiguity that should be resolved before any consumer redress provision such as section 203 is enacted. In my judgment, the basis of which will be explained
later, there are valid reasons for denying the FTC the power
to award compensatory damages in its proceedings and instead
requiring it to seek such consumer redress in the courts, but
those reasons are not nearly as applicable when the relief being
sought is merely a refund or restitution.' 0 ' Thus any provision
authorizing the FTC to obtain consumer redress in the federal
courts should expressly confer on the FTC the power to order
restitution. 62 This will alleviate the general uncertainty about
the FTC's remedial powers of which Chairman Kirkpatrick has
complained' 63 and will make it clear that Congress, in granting
the FTC the power to obtain consumer redress in the courts, did
not thereby deprive it of the authority to require restitution in
an FTC order.
2. Effect of an FTC Suit on Individual Causes of Action
Senator Marlow Cook, who unsuccessfully tried to delete
section 203 from S. 986 on the Senate floor,'1 4 pointed out a number of potentially serious deficiencies in the section. One such
defect is the failure to deal expressly with the possible effect of
an FTC consumer redress suit upon the causes of action that
individual consumers might have against the defendant under
state law, whether they be tort actions for deceit, contract ac160. No reference to this problem was found in the debates on the
Senate floor.
161. See text accompanying notes 224-28 infra.
162. For further recommendations concerning the nature and scope
of this power, see notes 226-28 infra and accompanying text.
163. See text accompanying note 130 supra.
164. Senator Cook's attempt to delete section 203 was defeated, 49-30.
117 COxG. REc. 17,875 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1971).
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tions, or suits under state deceptive practice statutes. 16 In the
main, the problem has two aspects. First, may a consumer who
has recovered as the result of a consumer redress action prosecuted by the FTC continue to press and ultimately collect in an
action based upon the same facts but founded upon the provisions of state law rather than upon section 5 of the FTC Act?
Second, if the FTC seeks redress for a consumer and loses because the court concludes that the consumer was not in fact injured by the defendant's actions, may the consumer still recover
in an action under state law based upon the same facts?
When initially queried on this subject on the Senate floor,
Senator Spong, the author of section 203 in committee, stated
that FTC actions under the section would have no res judicata
effect on private suits. He reasoned that since there was no private right of action under the FTC Act, any consumer suit would
have to be based upon a different cause of action, and thus res
judicata would be inapplicable. 16
When pressed by Senator
Ervin about the danger of a double recovery by a consumer,
Senator Spong indicated that an individual who had previously
recovered would be precluded from a second recovery to avoid
"unjust enrichment".' 6 7 But, according to Senator Spong, an
individual dissatisfied with the result of an FTC suit could still
recover under state law for acts that were the subject of the
FTC suit, limited only by the necessity of having to deduct from
his recovery in the state action amounts actually received as a
08
result of the FTC suit.
Assuming that the danger of a direct double recovery is
eliminated, the Spong position is not entirely unreasonable. In
165. See, e.g., Senator Cook's remarks at 117 CONG. REc. 17,865
(daily ed. Nov. 8, 1971).
166. 117 CONG. REc. 17,872 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1971). As to res judicata, strictly speaking, Senator Spong would be correct, since res judicata serves only to preclude further litigation on the same cause of action. See lB J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE
0.401 (2d ed. 1965). There
remains, however, the question whether collateral estoppel would pre-

clude a consumer from re-litigating in a subsequent action an issue actually determined in a prior FTC suit.
167. 117 CONG. REC. 17,872 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1971).
168. See id., 17,872-73. However, if the consumer had previously
recovered from the defendant in a private suit in which the consumer
directly participated, collateral estoppel might well operate to preclude
relitigating in a later FTC suit any issue actually determined in the
earlier private suit. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (1942). A

possible difficulty in reaching this conclusion is that the consumer would
not technically, under the Senate version, be a "party" to the subsequent
FTC suit. The recovery is for his benefit, however, and the policy
against relitigating seems equally applicable.
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fact, it is quite similar to the "one-way intervention" that was
allowed in so-called "spurious" class actions under the former
version of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Unnamed members of the class were not bound by the judgment
but could intervene after the judgment to obtain its benefits.600
Such "one-way intervention" would necessarily be the result
under the version of the consumer redress section passed by the
Senate. Since no provision was made for notice to or intervention by consumers on whose behalf the FTC would be suing, such
consumers would have no opportunity to control or remove
themselves from the litigation. The requirements of due process would preclude binding such consumers by adverse determinations in an FTC consumer redress suit.'70 In a time of increasingly crowded judicial dockets, however, such "one-way in-

tervention" begins to be suspect, particularly if it would result
in two or more courts having to decide the same issue (such as

whether consumer X was damaged by defendant's unfair trade
practice).
One sensible solution to this difficulty, arguably the most
sensible, is to apply to an FTC consumer redress action many
of the rules and procedures established for private class actions
under new Federal Rule 23.171 During the floor debate on S.
986, the supporters of the bill protested vigorously that the con172
sumer redress section was not a "class action" provision.
Technically, they are correct, since Rule 23 refers to actions
brought by one or more "members of a class" as representatives
of all the class members. Except in the most unusual of circumstances, the FTC would not qualify as a "member" of the class of
consumers for whom it seeks redress. Thus the proposed FTC
consumer redress action is not a true "class action" and therefore Rule 23 would not be likely to be considered controlling
in such an action unless Congress expressly so provided.
Moreover, some of the provisions of Rule 23 would be inappropriate to apply to an FTC consumer redress action. For example, Rule 23 establishes criteria for determining whether a
169. See Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561
(10th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 801 (1962); see generally Starrs,

The Consumer Class Action-Part 11: Considerationsof Procedure, 49
B.U.L. REv. 407, 467-68 (1969).
170. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
(1950); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
171. FED.R. Civ. P.23 [hereinafter cited as Rule 23].
172. See, e.g., remarks of Senator Moss, 117 CONG. REc. 17,859 (daily
ed. Nov. 8, 1971).
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class action may be maintained. Particularly when the reason
for maintaining a class action is the existence of common questions of law or fact, the court is given relatively broad discretion to permit or reject a class suit depending on whether the
class suit is "superior" to other methods of adjudicating the controversy. 17 3 In an FTC consumer redress suit under the proposed statute, however, these provisions regarding the maintainability of a class action would be superfluous. For the proposed
statute expressly authorizes the FTC to sue for consumer redress, and there is no indication that the courts were to have
any discretion to refuse to hear the merits of an FTC suit on
grounds similar to those found in Rule 23.174
While Rule 23's provisions regarding the maintainability of
a class action are inappropriate to an FTC consumer redress action, the other provisions in Rule 23 governing notice, the conduct of the action, and the scope of the judgment seem both appropriate and useful in an FTC action. These rules are intended
to give the court sufficient powers to handle adequately a mass
redress action and to ensure that the interests of non-participating members of the class are fairly and adequately represented.
Ultimately, the rules are intended to provide the basis for finding the class judgment binding upon non-participating members.17 5 To this end, Rule 23 requires that the best practicable
notice be given to members of the class. 75 Class members are
173.

See Rule 23(b) (3).

174. Questions concerning the manageability and appropriateness
of such a mass recovery action would presumably be considered by the
FTC, and it may have been assumed that the FTC's limited time and
resources would deter the bringing of entirely unmanageable actions. Cf.
Senator Spong's statement that he thought the proposed authority for
consumer redress suits would be used infrequently. 117 CONG. REc.
17,870 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1971).

175. This is the intent, even though it is recognized that the precise
res judicata effect of a judgment may be determined only in a subsequent action. See Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 106 (1966).
176. Whether individual notice to all identifiable members of the
class is necessary is a matter of current dispute. The language of Rule
23(c) (2)- "including individual notice to all members who can be
identified through reasonable effort"-seems relatively clear, but at least
one court has held that individual notice to identifiable persons with a
large stake in the outcome and to a statistically-selected sample of the
remainder of a large class would suffice. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
52 F.R.D. 253, 265-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). The decision in Eisen is endorsed
in 7A C. WRIGrr & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1786, at
148-50 (1972). See also Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal
Rule, 71 COLv
M. L. REv. 609, 645-46 (1971); Kaplan, Continuing Work of

the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (I), 81 HARv. L. REv. 356, 396 (1967).
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given the chance to opt-out of the suit by requesting exclusion
by a certain date.177 But the rule also provides that the judgment in a class action is to cover all class members who do not
exclude themselves, thus establishing the basis for using the
judgment as res judicata against class members who do not opt
out.

78

If such procedures and such a relatively broad res judicata
effect are appropriate in private class actions, they appear at
least equally so in an FTC-initiated consumer redress action
where the "class representative" is not a private party seeking
its own recovery, but rather the FTC acting in a "parens pa-

triae" role. For one of the most difficult recurring problems in
class action litigation is that of assuring that the class representative fairly and adequately represents the interest of the
other members of the class.' 7 Of particular concern are the
competence of the representative party's attorney and the conflicts of interest that might exist between the representative
party and members of the class. When the class representative
is a government agency such as the FTC, however, the concerns
about the competence and fairness with which non-participants'
interests are protected become less substantial since the FTC,
with no claim of its own to press, is less likely than a private
representative party to0 have interests that conflict with those of
18
other class members.
177. Rule 23(c) (2). Members are further advised that they may
enter an appearance through counsel if they desire.
178. Rule 23(c) (3). For a case applying res judicata against
class members who had not opted out when given notice of a settlement with respect to their class in the tetracycline litigation, see In re
Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F.
Supp. 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd 450 F.2d 1119 (2d Cir. 1972).
179. See generally 7A C. WSIGHT & A. MILEn, supra note 176,
§§ 1766-69; Starrs, supra note 169, at 500-04.
180. It might be thought that the FTC, lacking any claim of its own,
might prove generally less vigorous than a private representative party
in pressing a suit. That has not proven to be the case, however, with
respect to the enforcement of private rights by other government agencies, such as NLRB actions for back pay or Labor Department actions for
unpaid minimum or overtime wages (see notes 181-87 infra and accompanying text). Likewise, once the FTC decides to bring a consumer redress action, there is no general reason to suppose that it will be less
vigorous than would a private representative party. Nonetheless, some
conflict between the interests of the FTC and of consumer class members
still might arise, particularly if the FTC desires to dismiss or compromise an action because, for example, the action is more complex and will
require more FTC resources than was initially contemplated. In such
a case, interests of the class members could be protected by application
of Rule 23 (e), requiring notice to class members concerning, and court
supervision of, proposed dismissals and compromises.
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Another model that might be used for solving the potential
conflict between an FTC consumer redress suit and private actions is found in a federal statute authorizing the Secretary of
Labor to sue an employer to collect unpaid minimum wages or
overtime compensation for the benefit of his employees. 18 '
Under that particular statute, the Secretary could sue only if he
had received a written request from an employee that the Secretary prosecute his claim. But with such a written request, the
employee waived the rights the statute also gave him'8 2 to sue
on his own behalf for unpaid minimum wages or overtime com13
pensation.
There are two essential differences between this model (the
"labor model") and the Rule 23 model. First, under the labor
statute, the Secretary could sue only upon request of named employees. Imposing such a requirement in an FTC consumer redress action appears unwise, if only because the individuals for
whom relief is being sought may be much more numerous and
difficult to identify early in an FTC action than in a Labor Department action for wages due employees of a specific employer.
Moreover, the consent requirement apparently was considered
a mistake even in the Labor Department actions-a change in
another section of the labor statutes has now effectively dispensed with individual consent as a prerequisite to Labor De84
partment recovery for individual employees.
A second difference between the labor model and the Rule
23 model is that suit by the Secretary under the labor statutes
effectively terminates the employee's individual right of action.18 5 An employee apparently has no right to opt out of the
Secretary's mass litigation, even if the suit is brought, as is now
possible, without his specific consent or request.180 Whatever
181.
182.
183.

29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1970 Supp. 1972).
See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970).
29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1970 Supp. 1972).

184. 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1970) authorizes the Secretary to sue, without
to

the request of any employee, to enjoin an employer from refusing

pay minimum and overtime wages due. It is now generally held that
the Secretary may actually recover unpaid wages for employees in such
injunctive proceedings, since a statutory prohibition against such recovery was repealed in 1961 (75 Stat. 74). See, e.g., Wirtz v. W.G. Lockhart Constr. Co., 230 F. Supp. 823 (N.D. Ohio 1964). An injunction suit
by the Secretary terminates the employee's individual right to sue. See
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970).
185.

29 U.S.C. § 216(b)-(c) (1970); id. § 216(c) (Supp. 1972).

186. See Jones v. American Window Cleaning Corp., 210 F. Supp.
921 (E.D. Va. 1962), upholding the constitutionality of so terminating
the employee's right of action on the ground that, since the right of re-
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the propriety of such a result under the labor statutes, where
the only cause of action that the employee loses is a federal statutory cause of action for recovery of minimum or overtime
wages, a similar rule should not apply to FTC consumer redress
suits.
There is no reason that the mere filing by the FTC of a suit
seeking mass redress for a violation of the FTC Act should immediately deprive all members of the affected class of their
rights to pursue possible recoveries based upon applicable state
law, such as tort, contract or state consumer fraud statutes.
While the federal government might be able to pre-empt state
regulation of deceptive practices and the provision of remedies
therefor, it has clearly not done so,1s7 and the magnitude of
the problem would make such pre-emption entirely unrealistic.
The termination of state law rights of action by the filing of an
FTC consumer redress suit would undercut to a significant degree the intent to have state law continue to operate in the area
of deceptive practices. Thus the greatest effect that reasonably
can be sought for an FTC action is that the consumers for whom
redress is sought be given sufficient notice and have their interests adequately safeguarded so that they may ultimately be
bound by the judgment in the FTC action under normal principles of collateral estoppel.
One purpose of examining the statutes authorizing the Secretary of Labor to sue for employees' minimum and overtime
wages has been to point out that the Congress has previously
recognized and expressly dealt with the problem of conflict with
private causes of action when it has created in a federal government agency the power to sue to enforce the rights of individuals. The proposal for FTC consumer redress suits passed by
the Senate in 1971 is clearly deficient in not even attempting to
resolve that problem. One possible solution, and apparently the
one intended by the sponsors, 8 8 is essentially the "one-way incovery was created by federal statute, the Congress could limit that
right. When the Senate Commerce Committee proposed authorizing
private class rights of action under the FTC Act, it included a provision
requiring that any such class action be stayed and consolidated with
any action brought by the FTC or the Attorney General seeking redress
for the same class of consumers. See S. 3201, § 206(b) in S. REP. No.
91-1124, supra note 138, at 26.
187. Witness the widespread existence of 'Little FTC Acts" in the
states. See CouxcIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, 1970 SUGGESTED STATE
LuoisLATiox 141-42 (1969). The FTC has also been placing some increased emphasis on federal-state cooperation. See ABA REPoRT, supra
note 6, at 50.
188. See notes 166-68 supra and accompanying text.
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tervention" rule formerly applicable to spurious class actionsthe judgment in the FTC suit would not be binding at all on
consumers, who would not be parties to the suit. If this is the
intent, it should be expressly indicated in the statute to avoid
confusion. Such a result, however, may be unfair to defendants
and may engender unnecessary multiple litigation, especially
since a defendant who established in the FTC suit that consumer
X was not injured by his actions would not be protected from
a subsequent suit by consumer X to recover for the same acts under state law and in which the precise same issue of whether
X was injured must be relitigated.
In order to avoid this result, it is suggested that the close
analogy between the proposed FTC consumer redress suit and a
Rule 23 class action be recognized. The provisions of Rule 23
governing notice to class members, opting out of the class, scope
of the judgment and court supervision should be made expressly
applicable to FTC consumer redress suits. Consumers who do
not opt out would then be considered members of a "class" represented by the FTC. As such, they would be considered parties
by representation in the FTC suit and bound by the judgment
therein as if they were actual parties. 8 9 In any subsequent suit
brought by consumer class members under state law, then, the
class members would be bound, under the doctrine of collateral
estoppel, as to issues actually litigated and necessarily determined in the FTC suit. 190
3.

Effect of an FTC Order in a Subsequent Consumer Redress
Action

Under the Senate version of the consumer redress provision,
the FTC could initiate an action for consumer redress only after
189. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 86 and comment i (1942);
7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 176, § 1789, at 178-79. Class
members could, of course, attack the binding effect of the judgment on
the grounds that their interests had not been adequately represented by
the FTC, or that they had not received the requisite notice. See 7A
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, id.
190. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (1942); see generally lB
J. MOORE,supra note 166,

1111
0.401,

0.405; 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra

note 176, § 1789, at 180. In any subsequent state court action the constitutional requirement of full faith and credit would normally require
that the subsequent court give the same res judicata and collateral effect
to the first judgment as would be given in the jurisdiction rendering the
first judgment. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 176, § 2372, at
232, citing RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 47, comment c (1942).
Expressly making the consumer class members parties by representation in the FTC suit would also ensure that recovery is not obtained
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an FTC order concerning the acts or practices in question had
become final.191 During the debate on the Senate floor, Senator
Cook raised the question of what effect the FTC final order
would be given in the subsequent consumer redress suit and
charged that the provision was defective for not answering that
question. 192 The failure to deal with this matter in the legislation, however, is not necessarily as serious as Senator Cook suggested. Even absent specific legislation, a fairly reasonable resolution of this issue could be reached by application of established doctrines of collateral estoppel.
Collateral estoppel effect, or a very similar effect, is already

given to final orders of the Federal Trade Commission in a
number of situations. One instance is when the government
brings a civil penalty suit 193 for violation of a final' 94 cease and
desist order. It is well settled that the defendant cannot relitigate in the penalty suit the question whether the acts that
were the subject of the order were violations of the FTC Act;
nor may he in the subsequent penalty suit challenge the propriety of the original order. 19 5 In these situations at least, it is
clear that final FTC orders have a conclusive effect upon some
subsequent litigation.
Another important example of subsequent litigation in
which a final FTC order has significant effect is a private antitrust treble damage action based upon antitrust violations that
previously were the subject of a final FTC order. Section 5(a)
of the Clayton Act provides that final judgments or decrees obtained by the Government in antitrust cases shall be "prima
facie evidence" against the defendant in a subsequent private
antitrust suit.196 Recent decisions have uniformly held that
FTC final orders with respect to Clayton Act violations are final
judgments obtained by the Government within the meaning of
section 5(a) of the Clayton Act and thus are admissible as prima
in the FTC suit for a consumer who lost on the precise same issue in a
prior state law action between him and the defendant As a party to
both suits against the defendant, collateral estoppel would clearly apply
against the consumer. See note 168 supra.
191. S. 986, § 203 (Senate version).
192. Remarks of Senator Cook, 117 CoNG. Rsc. 17,865 (daily ed. Nov.
8, 1971); see also remarks of Senator Hruska, id. at 17,867.
193. Under 45 U.S.C. § 45 (1) (1970).
194. The finality provisions are found in 45 U.S.C. § 45(g) (1970).
195. See United States v. Wilson Chemical Co., 1962 Trade Cas.
70,478 (W.D. Pa. 1962), affid per curiam, 319 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1963)
(original order had been contested); United States v. Vitasafe Corp.,
212 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (original order by consent).
196. 15U.S.C. § 16(a) (1970).
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facie evidence of a violation in subsequent private actions'" 7
Obviously, those decisions and the prima facie evidence provision of section 5(a) of the Clayton Act are not directly dispositive with respect to the effect of an FTC final order in a subsequent consumer redress suit. The Clayton Act provision deals
only with the effect of a Government-obtained antitrust judgment in a subsequent antitrust treble damage action, and there
is no similar provision in the FTC Act giving prima facie effect
198
to final FTC orders under section 5 (a) of the FTC Act.
The Clayton Act prima facie effect provision and the decisions under it are, nonetheless, very instructive for present purposes. The Clayton Act provides that prima facie effect is to be
given "as to all matters respecting which said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between the parties thereto
... "199 The Supreme Court has stated that the intent of this
provision was to confer on private parties as large an advantage
as the estoppel doctrine would have afforded had the Government brought suit. 20 0 This amounts to recognition that, even
absent a statutory provision such as section 5(a) of the Clayton
Act, collateral estoppel would apply if the subsequent litigation
were between the same parties. This would be the case in a
consumer redress action brought by the FTC after the finalization of an FTC cease and desist order. 20 1 Moreover, collateral
estoppel effect has been given to final orders of other adminis197.

E.g., Farmington Dowel Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d

61 (1st Cir. 1969); Purex Corp., Ltd. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 308 F.
Supp. 584 (C.D. Cal. 1970).

198. The obvious reason for this omission is that there is no private
right of action for violations of § 5(a) of the FTC Act. See authorities
cited in note 4 supra.
199.

15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1970).

200. Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558,
568 (1951).

201. The reason for the specific statutory provision governing the
effect of Government-obtained judgments in private treble damage actions apparently is two-fold. First, it may have been necessary to avoid
the possible application of the often criticized (and in recent years increasingly rejected) doctrine of mutuality, which precluded the ap-

plication of collateral estoppel unless the first judgment could have
been used as an estoppel by both parties to the second action. For an
interesting treatment of the general problem, see Semmel, Collateral
Estoppel, Mutuality and Joinder of Parties, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1457

(1968). Second, the Congress apparently desired to make the judgment
in the Government suit only prima facie (and thus rebuttable) evidence
in a subsequent private suit, rather than to make it conclusive (which
would have been the result if collateral estoppel were applied). See
Purex Corp. Ltd. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 308 F. Supp. 584, 589 (C.D.
Cal. 1970).
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trative agencies without any express statutory provision dealing
2 0- 2
with the applicability of collateral estoppeL
Thus, absent any governing statute, an FTC final order probably would have a collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent consumer redress action brought by the FTC against a party who
was a respondent in the FTC proceeding. 203 The FTC order
would be conclusive between the parties as to issues actually
raised and necessarily decided in the FTC proceeding. 20 ' The
collateral estoppel effect would be substantially different, however, depending upon whether the FTC order was a contested
one or one entered by consent. A contested order, based upon
FTC findings that the respondent committed certain acts or practices that violated section 5,205 would be conclusive as to the fact
that the respondent committed such acts or practices and as to
the conclusion that those acts or practices violated the FTC Act.
In the subsequent redress suit, the FTC still would have to establish that the defendant engaged in the prohibited acts or prac202. E.g., Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381
(1940) (Nat'l Bituminous Coal Comm'n decision against company binding on company in subsequent action by Internal Revenue Service);
In re Federal Water & Gas Corp., 188 F.2d 100 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
341 U.S. 953 (1951) (final SEC order is "res judicata" in proceeding
brought by SEC to enforce a subsequent SEC dissolution order); cf.
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943) (involving a final
workman's compensation award).
203. Consumers, of course, would not normally be parties to or
bound by adverse determinations in any FTC cease and desist proceeding against a respondent. Since those consumers are the real parties in
interest if the FTC brings a subsequent consumer redress action against
the respondent, it might be argued that the lack of mutuality between
the respondent and the consumers makes collateral estoppel inapplicable. Regardless of whether mutuality is still a requirement for collateral
estoppel generally (see Semmel, supra note 201), the mutuality argument
has little appeal in this situation. Although consumers would not be
bound by adverse determinations in an FTC proceeding to which they
were not parties, they also presently have no right of action for recovery
under the FTC Act other than as beneficiaries of the proposed FTC
consumer redress suit. See authorities cited note 4 supra. Moreover,
the FTC (the consumers' "representative") would be bound by adverse
determinations arising out of the FTC proceedings. The FTC would be
bound not only through normal principles of collateral estoppel but also
under the express provisions of the proposed statute, which would limit
the FTC's power to sue for consumer redress to instances in which
there is a final FTC order against the defendant covering the practices
for which recovery is sought. See S. 986, § 203 (Senate version).
204. That collateral estoppel applies only as to issues actually raised
and necessarily decided, see Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 338
(1957); Farmington Dowel Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61,
78-79 (1st Cir. 1969); see generally authorities cited note 190 supra.
205. Such findings are required by 45 U.S.C. § 45 (b) (1970).
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tices in dealings with the consumers for whom recovery is
sought, would have to prove the nature and extent of the injury
caused, and would have to show that the remedy being sought
20 6
was "necessary" to redress that injury.
On the other hand, a consent order entered prior to the taking of evidence by the administrative law judge would have almost no collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent consumer redress suit. It could not be said that any issue had been "actually
raised and necessarily decided". Moreover, FTC consent order
procedures provide that the agreement to the order may contain
a statement (which regularly is included) that agreement to the
order does not constitute an admission of any violations alleged
206.

It is assumed that the FTC would normally have to show the

nature and extent of injury to particular consumers, and that the damages recovered, if any, would normally be the sum of the damages
established for individual consumers. In a few massive private class actions, however, some courts have recently approved "fluid class recoveries" in which a figure was first established for defendant's monetary liability to the class as a whole. That "pot" was then to be dis-

tributed first by awards to individual class members, to the extent

that their individual entitlements could be established, with any remaining amounts in the fund to be distributed in a manner likely to be
beneficial to the class members generally (such as in the form of price
reductions to future customers of the defendant, if a substantial degree
of concurrence between the class and defendant's future customers is
likely). E.g., Bebchick v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 318 F.2d 187 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 913 (1963); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer &
Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971) (settlement); In re Coordinated Pretrial
Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 1971 Trade Cas.
73,482
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) (fluid class recovery is a possibility); see generally Comment,
Manageability of Notice and Damage Calculation in Consumer Class
Actions, 70 MxcH. L. REv. 338, 364-73 (1971). If such fluid class recoveries are occasionally appropriate in private class actions (a matter too
complex to be discussed at this time), they may also be appropriate in

FTC consumer redress suits.
If a "fluid class recovery" is to be employed in an FTC consumer
redress suit, there is even greater reason to require that the steps necessary to bind the non-participating members of the consumer class be
taken. If the judgment in the FTC suit is not binding on the consumer
class members, there would exist a substantial danger of imposing double liability upon the defendant, who could be subject in the FTC suit
to a fluid class judgment intended to cover his entire liability to the
consumer class and later subject to separate judgments in suits brought
under state law by individual members of the class who did not receive
any direct recovery as a result of the FTC suit. Such a situation could
arise, for example, in the case of an individual consumer who failed to
make a timely claim for a share in the FTC-obtained judgment. For a
general discussion of the res judicata effect of a judgment in the proposed FTC consumer redress action, see notes 164-90 supra and accompanying text.
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in the complaint. 20 7 Thus the consent order could not raise an
estoppel as to whether the respondent committed the acts alleged, nor could it be viewed as an admission that the acts alleged necessarily constitute violations of the FTC Act.20 8
In considering whether an adjudicated FTC final order
should be given the conclusive effect in a subsequent consumer
redress action that it would have if collateral estoppel applied,
certain differences between the FTC administrative proceeding
and the consumer redress action should be considered. First, although the formal parties would be the same in both proceedings, consumers and not the FTC would be the real party in interest in the consumer redress action. Second, there is a significant difference in the remedies available in the two proceedings-money damages in the consumer redress action as opposed
to, usually, a prospective cease and desist order in the FTC
proceeding. Such differences are also apparent in the case of
private treble damage actions litigated subsequent to a government-obtained antitrust decree. In that situation the government-obtained decree (including an FTC order) is given only
prima facie effect and is thus at least rebuttable.2 09 In view of
the similar function of treble damage actions and the proposed
consumer redress actions, there seems little reason to give an
2 10
FTC order greater effect in a consumer redress action.
In addition, there are positive reasons for giving an FTC
order something less than conclusive effect in a subsequent consumer redress action. Depending upon the precise nature of
the cease and desist order sought in an FTC proceeding, the
natural tendency of a respondent might be to resist less strongly
or less fully in that proceeding than he might if large monetary
207. 16 C.F.R. § 2.33 (1972).
208. It correctly is said that agreement to a consent order precludes
a defendant from asserting in a later civil penalty suit that the acts
alleged in the complaint were not violations of section 5. See, e.g.,
United States v. Vitasafe Corp., 212 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). But in
such cases the defendant is attempting to avoid a penalty for violating
a final order by challenging collaterally the validity of that order on
the ground that his acts did not justify the original imposition of the order. In a consumer redress suit, the defendant should be able to admit
the validity of the order to which he agreed (possibly for reasons unrelated to the validity of any specific allegation in the complaint) and
still retain his right to a full adjudication when the relief being requested is beyond that called for by the consent order.
209. See notes 196, 201 supra and accompanying text.
210. Cf. § 207(b) of S. 3201, as reported in S. REP. No. 91-1124, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 27-28 (1970), which would have given final FTC orders
prima facie effect in the private actions for violations of the FTC Act
that would have been authorized by S. 3201.
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liability could be imposed upon him. The fear of the effect of
an FTC order in a possible (but by no means certain) consumer
redress action may thus impel more respondents to exert their
all in the FTC proceeding. This might be both unfortunate for
the FTC, resulting in further delays in FTC proceedings, and
unfair to the respondents, who would have to conduct themselves before the FTC with too strong an eye on the possible
effect of the FTC proceeding on a consumer redress suit that has
21
not been and may well never be brought. '
On the other hand, since the FTC proceeding does provide
the respondent with the chance to litigate fully the issue of
whether he violated the FTC Act, he may not be that seriously
prejudiced if substantial weight is given to the FTC order in a
subsequent redress suit. It obviously would be highly inefficient to give the findings and conclusions of the FTC no effect
in the subsequent action. Giving the FTC proceedings prima
facie effect in a subsequent consumer redress suit appears to be
an appropriate compromise, by which the respondent would at
least retain some opportunity to rebut the FTC's findings and
conclusions if he has to defend a consumer redress suit. 212 For
this reason and also to avoid unnecessary uncertainty about the
effect of an FTC order, it is recommended that any statute authorizing the FTC to bring consumer redress actions contain a
provision similar to that of section 5(a) of the Clayton Act2la
giving an FTC order prima facie effect in any subsequent consumer redress action.
C.

WHICH ROAD TO CONSUMER REDRESS-THE

FTC OR THE COURTS?

The need for some means by which individuals may obtain
211. Concern for the respondent is particularly justified when, as
would be the case under the proposed consumer redress authority, he
has no power to request or compel consolidation of the cease and desist
and consumer redress proceedings.
212. Giving the FTC order prima facie effect also would clearly insulate the statutory scheme from attack on the ground that defendant's
right to a jury trial is being violated. See Meeker & Co. v. Lehigh
Valley R.R., 236 U.S. 412, 430 (1915), holding that giving an administrative order prima facie effect in a subsequent jury trial does not abridge
the jury trial guarantee, since the prima facie case is rebuttable; see also
Farmington Dowel Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61, 76 (ist
Cir. 1969). Although it was argued above that the FTC could be empowered to award compensatory damages without abridging the constitutional right to a jury trial (see notes 148-50 supra and accompany-

ing text), the defendant might be more likely to be found entitled to a
jury trial if the action is initially tried in a court. See L. JAFFE, supra
note 31, at 99, n.49.

213.

15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1970).
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redress for injury caused by unfair or deceptive practices violating the FTC Act is generally recognized. 214 Private redress not
only would provide a method for compensating individual injured consumers, but also would create a salutary additional deterrent against violations of the FTC Act. Even the present
administration, which opposed empowering the FTC to grant
redress to individual consumers,21 5 supported legislation that
would have permitted private class actions to recover for specified violations of the FTC Act after the Department of Justice
or the FTC had obtained a final judgment or order against the
defendant.2 16 Thus the present dispute is over the means for
providing this consumer redress.
One possible method for providing consumer redress is to
authorize private class actions for violations of the FTC Act.
The focus of this Article, however, is the potential for obtaining
individual consumer redress through action by the Federal Trade
Commission. This, then, is not the place to evaluate extensively
the wisdom of the private class action proposals. But whatever
the overall merits of private class actions, they do involve a
number of complex problems that have aroused much debate.
For example, private class suits raise fears of harassment and
"strike" suits brought primarily in the hopes of obtaining a nuisance value settlement, involve occasionally serious questions
concerning the interests of the private attorneys representing
the plaintiff class, and require careful scrutiny to ensure that
the interests of the class members have been fairly and ade-

quately represented in the litigation.21 7 These particular difficulties, however, either do not exist or are substantially less serious when a redress claim on behalf of a consumer class is prosecuted by a government agency such as the FTC.21 8
214. See, e.g., ABA REPORT, supra note 6, at 63, recommending the
creation of a private right of action but taking no position on whether
that right should be effectuated through private class actions or through
-the FTC or some other public authority acting as parens patriae.
215. Letter from the General Counsel of the Department of Commerce in S. REP. No. 92-269, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1971).
216. Letter from the Attorney General in S. REP. No. 91-1124, supra
note 210, at 39-40.
217. See, e.g., testimony of Milton Handler, reprinted in 117 CoNG.
REc. 17,867-68 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1971); separate views of Senator Marlow Cook on the private class action provision of S. 3201, S. Rm. No.
91-1124, supra note 210, at 77-78; Dole, The Settlement of Class Actions
for Damages,71 COLUm. L. Rsv. 971, 974-75 (1971).

218. See notes 179-80 supra and accompanying text. Even Senator
Cook, an opponent of both private class actions and FTC consumer redress suits, once recognized that there is much less potential for abuse
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Proposals to permit private class actions for monetary relief
under the FTC Act also have been opposed because businessmen
might be subject to potentially substantial monetary liability for
acts that they had no reason to believe were in violation of the
broad prohibitions of the FTC Act.2 19 Whatever the general
validity of this concern, 220 the problem again becomes less substantial when, as under S. 986, the class redress action may be
brought only by the FTC, which presumably would consider
whether the practices involved were relatively clear violations
in deciding whether to bring the redress action. 221 On a number
of grounds, then, there may be a substantial basis to prefer an
FTC-initiated consumer redress action to a private class action,
222
at least as a first step.
Two principal avenues of FTC-obtained consumer redress
have been suggested-FTC administrative proceedings and federal court actions brought by the FTC. Each has its advantages.
Authorizing the FTC to grant individual consumer redress, including compensatory damages, in its own administrative proceedings would result in the entire matter being settled in one
action. The respondent in the FTC proceeding would not have
to worry about the potential effect of that proceeding upon some
future but problematic suit by the FTC for consumer redress, as
he would under a statute authorizing FTC-initiated consumer
redress suits only after finalization of an FTC order. In addiof class actions when they are brought by a public official whose actions
must be guided by the public interest. See S. REP. No. 91-1124, supra
note 210, at 77. Other problems that normally arise in class actions, such

as the calculation and distribution of damages, would theoretically be
the same whether the action was brought by a private party or the FTC.
But the FTC might reasonably be expected, in the exercise of its discretion, to concentrate its mass redress activities on cases in which these
problems are relatively less serious.
219. See the testimony of Assistant Attorney General McLaren on
the private class action provision of S. 3201, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970),
in Hearings Before the Consumer Sub-Committee of the Senate Commit-

tee on Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st &
(1969-70).
220. It must again be emphasized
tion has identified a large variety of
violations of the FTC Act. See note
221.

2d Sess., ser. 91-48, part I, at 18
that judicial and FTC interpretapractices that are relatively clear
143 supra and accompanying text.

See notes 119-20 supra and accompanying text.

222. Of course, both methods of individual redress could eventually
be provided, although the statute should then deal expressly with the
problem of conflicting actions brought by individuals and by a government agency.

Cf. 29 U.S.C. §§ 216-17 (1970)

granting both individual

employees and the Secretary of Labor (suing on behalf of the employees)
the right to bring actions to collect unpaid minimum or overtime wages,
discussed supra notes 181-86 and accompanying text.
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tion, consumers might obtain their recovery faster if the award
could be made in an FTC proceeding itself rather than in a court
action that could not even be begun until an FTC order concern2 23
ing the acts or practices in question had become final.
Nonetheless, other and more significant reasons appear to
favor obtaining individual consumer redress through separate
court actions brought by the FTC. One important justification
for committing the adjudication of a particular controversy to an
administrative tribunal such as the FTC is that the administrative tribunal has certain advantages over a court that will lead
to better or more consistent decisions: either the agency has technical expertise necessary to deal with the problems involved or
it has developed (or is supposed to develop) a specialized legal
competence with respect to the issues committed to its jurisdiction. If the issue, then, is whether a party violated section 5 of
the FTC Act, the specialized competence of the FTC in interpreting section 5 and the desire for uniform interpretation of the
section provide at least some basis for committing the resolution
of that issue to the FTC, subject to appropriate judicial review.
But when consumer redress is sought, the issue is whether an
individual consumer has been injured by a violation of the FTC
Act and, if so, what relief is appropriate to compensate him for
that injury. The FTC possesses no particular expertise on these
issues when compared with ordinary courts, in which issues of
the extent of an injury, causation and the appropriate compensatory remedy are decided daily. Since the positive reasons
for FTC jurisdiction are lacking when individual consumer redress is sought, it is submitted that consumer redress actions
should be brought in the courts, where the defendant can have
the advantage of whatever additional procedural safeguards
224
there are in court proceedings..
223. One possible solution to the delay problem created by separate consumer redress suits would be to permit the FTC to bring such
suits whether or not there was a final order against the defendant.
That approach apparently was favored by the Senate Commerce Committee in 1970. See § 103 of S. 3201, as reported in S. RP. No. 91-1124, supra
note 210, at 21. Such a scheme would be wasteful, however. The question whether a defendant had violated the FTC Act would have to be
litigated fully in the consumer redress suit while that very question was
still being considered by the FTC itself or by the courts on appeal
from an FTC order. Thus if the FTC must initiate a separate action for
consumer redress, it is eminently more reasonable to postpone any such
suit until an FTC order against the defendant has become final.
224. One such procedural safeguard is the right to a jury trial. See
generally notes 148-50, 212 supra and accompanying text. Another
problem is reflected in the debate over the propriety of combining
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This split procedure, involving separate forums for determining the existence of a violation and for awarding redress to
consumers, has the added advantage that FTC administrative law
judges would not have to devote a potentially large amount of
time to the adjudication of damage questions as to which they
have no particular expertise. Moreover, it is not entirely clear
that consumer redress would be obtained any less quickly
through FTC-initiated court action than through an administrative proceeding. Even in FTC proceedings it might be reasonable to adjudicate the issues of statutory violation first and then,
only if the respondent is finally found to have violated the FTC
Act, to remand the proceeding to the administrative law judge
or a master to determine the separate issues of the extent of individual consumer injury and the nature of the appropriate redress.225' Thus no matter which route is selected, there may
often be two separate proceedings, one adjudicating statutory
violation and the other deciding issues of remedy. I would
therefore recommend that individual consumer redress, such as
compensatory damages, for violation of the FTC Act be obtained
through FTC-initiated suits in the federal district courts rather
than through administrative orders of the FTC itself.
However, if the only relief being sought is essentially restitution, such as the refund of advance payments made by consumers for products they never received, the considerations are
sufficiently distinguishable, in my view, to lead to a different
result. First, the restitution interest being protected is generprosecutory and adjudicatory functions in an administrative agency.
See note 151 supra and accompanying text.
One intermediate solution to these problems, a solution proposed in
1970 by the Senate Commerce Committee, would be to permit the FTC
to order individual redress but to make its order subject to de novo review as to the remedy provisions. See note 133 supra and accompanying text. Under that proposal the defendant would, in theory, be free of
the substantial evidence rule and the deference otherwise accorded the
findings and conclusions of the FTC. But de novo review of a remedy by
the court of appeals would still have to be based upon the record made
before the Commission. Once the concept of de novo review is accepted, it seems far preferable to have the entire question of consumer
redress litigated initially before a tribunal that is equipped to hold a
full evidentiary hearing-the district court. A prior decision by the
FTC on the issue of relief would thus be superfluous.
225. A comparable procedure is frequently employed in class actions seeking monetary relief. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).

Such a split adjudication might also

lead to the earlier entry of a final prospective cease and desist order,
thus having the advantage of at least preventing the respondent at an
early date from continuing his unfair practices.
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ally conceded to be deserving of greater protection by our legal
sy'stem than is the consumer's interest in obtaining compensatory damages. 226 Second, the difficulties in determining the appropriate award (and thus the need for the relative expertise of
the courts in dealing with such issues) frequently are not nearly
as great when restitution alone is involved.22 7 In many cases,
appropriate restitution awards might be agreed to merely on the
basis of the respondent's customer lists. Finally, since a respondent's retention of money or property advanced by consumers may often be a continuing violation of section 5 of the
FTC Act, the FTC arguably needs the power to order restitution
to fulfill its traditional function of adequately assuring the discontinuance of prohibited practices. On the other hand, the ability to provide purely compensatory relief is not likely to be necessary for that purpose. Thus, while restitution should certainly
be an available remedy under any statute authorizing the FTC
to bring court actions to obtain consumer redress, the statute
should also authorize the FTC to compel restitution by its own
orders, at least where such restitution is necessary to terminate
22 8
a continuing unfair practice.
The option the FTC would have to obtain restitution for
consumers, either by its own order or by a court proceeding,
would be best exercised as follows: If relief in additiorf to restitution (such as compensatory damages) is to be sought from a
respondent, efficiency would normally dictate that the entire
matter of consumer redress be decided in court proceedings
brought by the FTC. Even if only restitution were being sought,
the FTC might well decide to seek restitution in the courts if
the process of determining the amount of or persons entitled
to such relief appeared potentially complex. Thus the FTC might
well award restitution in its own proceedings only if restitution
is the only relief being sought and there are no particular difficulties in determining individual restitution awards.

D.

RECOMVNADATIONS FOR CONGRESSIONAL AcTIoN

In order to at least partially meet the generally recognized
need for some mechanism by which individuals may obtain redress for injuries suffered as a consequence of violations of section 5 of the FTC Act, the Congress should enact a provision
226. See
ages, 46 YArx
227 See
228. See

Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract DamL.J. 52, 56-57 (1936).
notes 96-99 supra and accompanying text.
text accompanying notes 162-63 supra.
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similar to that passed by the Senate in 1971. Such a provision
would authorize the FTC to initiate suits in the federal district
courts to obtain redress for individual consumers, including restitution, compensatory damages, and other appropriate relief.
The FTC's authority should be limited, as it was in section 203 of
S. 986, to cases in which the FTC had previously obtained a final
cease and desist order against the respondent covering the acts
or practices for which redress is sought. 229 In other respects,
however, substantial changes should be made from the provision
that the Senate passed. In order to dispel any question concerning the FTC's existing powers, at least as enunciated by the FTC
in Curtis, and to resolve possible questions concerning the effect of the new provision on that authority, the provision should
expressly authorize the FTC to compel restitution by its own
order when such restitution is necessary to terminate a continuing violation of section 5.
Another problem not adequately dealt with in the Senate
version of S. 986 is the effect of a judgment in an FTC consumer
redress suit on consumer rights of action under state law. Since
the consumer redress suit is essentially a consumer class action,
except that the representative party is the FTC rather than a
private party, this fact should be recognized. The provisions of
Federal Rule 23 governing notice to class members, opting out
of the class, scope of the judgment, and court supervision of the
action and any settlements should expressly be made applicable to consumer redress suits. Thus the consumers for whom
redress is sought would be parties by representation in the FTC
suit and the foundation would be laid for applying collateral
estoppel to bind those members of the consumer class with respect to issues actually raised and necessarily decided in the
230
FTC consumer redress suit.
Finally, any provision authorizing the FTC to bring a consumer redress suit should deal expressly with the question of
the effect in that suit of a final FTC order previously entered
against the defendant involving the same acts or practices. It is
229. § 203 of S. 986 (Senate version) also contained a requirement
that the FTC commence suit within two years after the FTC order had
become final. There should be some such statute of limitations, and the
two year period basically appears reasonable, but I express no final
opinion as to the appropriate length of the limitations period.
230. On the general problem of the effect of an FTC consumer redress action on private causes of action, see notes 164-90 supra and
accompanying text, particularly the text accompanying notes 175-80
supra.
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recommended that the statute contain a provision, similar to that
of section 5 (a) of the Clayton Act, under which final FTC orders
would be given1 prima facie effect in any subsequent consumer
redress action.

23

IV. SUMMARY AND REFLECTION ON PRIORITIES
This Article has dealt with only one relatively narrow means
of assuring consumer redress-obtaining monetary recovery for
individual consumers through action by the Federal Trade Commission. I have argued that, even under its existing statute, the
FTC does have the authority to order a respondent to make restitution of money or property received from injured consumers
when such a restitution order is appropriate to terminate a continuing unfair practice. This could include an instance in which
an unfair practice resulted in a respondent retaining consumer
payments that substantially exceeded the value of his performance.2 32 I have also recommended that the FTC be authorized

to initiate suits in the federal district courts to obtain monetary
redress, including both restitution and compensatory damages,
for consumers.

233

Having said all of this, it is necessary to recognize the obvious. That is, investing the FTC with the power to obtain relief for individual consumers is no panacea for the general problem of providing effective consumer redress. The typical individual redress proceeding, whether administrative or judicial, is
likely to consume far more FTC time and staff resources than
the typical prospective cease and desist proceeding. Too substantial a focus on obtaining monetary redress would be a highly
inefficient use of the FTC's limited resources because it would
divert the FTC's attention from what should remain its primary
goal-the establishment of standards to guide future conduct in
the marketplace. Even the Senate proponents of S. 986 recognized that the FTC probably would use sparingly any new authority to obtain monetary redress for consumers..2 34
231. See generally notes 191-213 supra and accompanying text,
particularly the text accompanying notes 209-13 supra.
232. See part II supra.
233. See notes 214-31 supra and accompanying text.
234. See remarks of Senator Spong, 117 CONG. Rc. 17,870 (daily ed.
Nov. 8, 1971); see also the following statement in the Senate Commerce
Committee's report on S. 3201, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), which also

contained a provision authorizing the FTC to sue in the federal courts
to obtain relief for individual consumers:
It was not the purpose of the Committee, in granting the
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I previously suggested a number of factors the FTC should
weigh in deciding whether to seek restitution through administrative orders under Curtis.235 Most of those factors appear
equally relevant in the determination to prosecute a consumer
redress suit under the proposed legislation, although the relative
importance of the various considerations may vary slightly. The
concern about the possible drain on FTC resources raised by
the need to resolve new and complex issues of materiality, reliance and value of performance may be reduced, for example, because the courts, rather than FTC administrative law judges and
members, would be deciding those issues. 2 0 Nonetheless, the
primary objective of any action to obtain monetary recoveries,
whether administrative or judicial, should continue to be the
furtherance of the basic prophylactic purposes of the FTC Act.
The FTC should concentrate on obtaining redress where such
actions, in addition to providing relief for consumers, will significantly deter future violations 237 or eliminate otherwise anticompetitive effects of past unfair practices.
The proposed authority of the FTC to obtain compensatory
damages for injured consumers raises several additional considerations. Although an FTC suit for damages might be justified
in some situations-particularly if a clear violation of the Act
resulted in substantial out-of-pocket reliance losses to consumers-there are a number of reasons for the FTC to seek damages
much less frequently than restitution. First, the restitution interest is generally conceded to deserve greater protection by
our legal system than do the interests satisfied by compensatory
damages, since restitution involves both out-of-pocket loss and
FTC this authority, to transform the Commission into a gigantic
government-financed law firm operating on behalf of all
Thus, it is anticipated
cheated or defrauded consumers ....
that the Commission will institute such court action . . . only
in the cases which fall within its priorities relating to the sig-

nificance of the impact of the act or practice involved on the
marketplace. Actions for relief will necessarily be ancillary
to the primary function of the Commission.
S. REP. No. 91-1124, supra note 210, at 10.
235. See notes 119-29 supra and accompanying text.
236. Obviously, the FTC still should avoid burdening the courts with
unmanageable problems of this nature.
One other concern present if the FTC seeks to impose restitution

administratively and absent in a consumer redress suit is the problem
of delay in obtaining a prospective cease and desist order, which would
have been secured prior to any decision to institute a consumer redress
suit.
237. The focus of FTC redress actions in this respect should be upon
clear and serious violations of section 5. See notes 119-22 supra and accompanying text.
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unjust enrichment. 238 Second, it normally will be more difficult
to determine the appropriate individual compensatory damage
award than to determine restitution, partly because proof of
damages would likely depend more substantially upon facts peculiar to specific individuals, and partly because the measurement of damages is often speculative. Third, the monetary impact upon the defendant is likely to be more serious if damages
are awarded. Finally, and most important from the FTC's
standpoint, restitution alone, although not always fully compensating the consumer, will normally be sufficient to achieve the
public objective of deterrence by depriving the defendant of the
benefits of his unfair practice.
The costs and difficulties inherent in a federal administrative agency attempting to provide monetary redress for consumers throughout the country indicate quite clearly that obtaining such individual redress must remain a relatively minor
and ancillary function of the FTC. It should continue to concentrate its adjudicatory efforts on quickly obtaining largely
prospective cease and desist orders for the principal purpose of
protecting the consuming public from future repetitions of unfair practices. Moreover, a sound argument can be made that
the FTC should devote less of its overall efforts to case-by-case
adjudication and more to general rule making.2 30 Expanded
rule making may often be the most efficient means of establishing with certainty the major requirements of section 5, informing the business community of those requirements, and thereby
promoting broad nationwide compliance with the FTC Act.240
238. See Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YArx L.J. 52, 56-57 (1936).
239. This proposition has been forcefully urged by a former member of the Federal Trade Commission. See Elman, Administrative Reform of the Federal Trade Commission, 59 GEo. L.J. 777, 826 (1971).
The FTC claims that it presently has the authority to make substantive
rules, relying in substantial part upon § 6(g) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 46(g) (1970), which authorizes the promulgation of rules for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Act. But see National
Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 1972 Trade Cas. 73,910 (D.D.C. 1972),
holding that the FTC lacks authority to make such rules. The matter
has been discussed by a number of commentators. See, e.g., Auerbach,
The Federal Trade Commission: Internal Organization and Procedure,
48 Mnn-. L. REv. 383, 455-59 (1964); Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and
Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 490-96 (1970).
Cf. § 206 of S. 986 (Senate version) which would have expressly granted
the FTC substantive rule-making authority with respect to acts or practices deceptive to consumers.
240. Robinson, supra note 239, at 513-28, criticizes what he deems
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If the real objective is to provide an effective means for
securing monetary redress to all consumers injured by unfair
or deceptive practices, however, it will be necessary to look beyond the FTC. One approach might be to authorize private
class actions to recover damages for FTC Act violations, but such
proposals raise other problems of propriety and control,24 ' and
previous attempts to obtain Congressional approval of such
private actions have been notably unsuccessful. 24 2 Another possibility might be to authorize state government agencies to obtain monetary redress for consumers under state consumer fraud
statutes. Such authority presently exists in a number of states,
and substantial amounts have been recovered for consumers.2 '
But the result has often been excessive concentration on individual complaints and on obtaining individual redress, with a
consequent failure of state enforcement agencies to plan their
activities effectively and to perform their basic function of es2
tablishing standards for the marketplace in general. '1
Other proposals for providing mechanisms for consumer redress may have greater potential, but they can only be listed
here. Some, for example, have suggested plans for compulsory
arbitration of consumer-merchant disputes, 245 while others have
suggested a nationwide system of small claims courts for the
adjudication of consumer controversies. 2' 6 Workable systems
overbroad generalizations concerning the efficacy of rule-making and
suggests the need for more careful analysis with respect to the choice of
procedure employed by an administrative agency.

Many of his com-

ments are well taken, and it is not contended here that adjudication is
an inappropriate activity of the FTC, but only that it should consider
rule-maling more often when such a procedure in fact has advantages.

241. See notes 217-22 supra and accompanying text.
242.

See S. 3201, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reported by the Senate

Commerce Committee in S. REP. No. 91-1124, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
No floor action was taken, and the provision for a private class action

was dropped by the Committee from the successor bill to S. 3201, S. 986.
243. E.g., ILL. ANN . STAT. ch. 1211/z, § 267 (Smith-Hurd 1972);

N.J. REv. STAT. § 56:8-8 (Supp. 1971). Thirteen states responding to a
1972 survey reported obtaining over $100,000 annually for consumers,
and three reported recoveries approaching or exceeding $1 million annually. See NATIONAL Ass'N OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, COMMITTEE ON
THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL AND CONSUMER PROTECTION COMMITTEE, STATE PROGRAMS FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION 52-53 (1972).

244. Most states concentrated on informal mediation to obtain restitution and rarely engaged in formal enforcement activities. See NATIONAL ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 243, at 45-51.
245. See, e.g., Eovaldi & Gestrin, Justice for Consumers: The Mechanism of Redress, 66 N.W.U.L. Rsv. 281, 306-19 (1971).
246. See, e.g., separate views of Senator Cook, S. REP. No. 92-269,
supra note 215, at 61.
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along either of these lines would have the major advantage of
relieving government agencies responsible for the enforcement
of deceptive practice statutes from the pressure to provide individual relief.
Even if such systems are adopted, however, the power to
obtain redress for consumers in selected cases would be a useful
adjunct to the remedial powers of the FTC, principally because
the judicious use of that authority by the FTC could have a substantial deterrent effect and aid substantially in effectuating the
overall enforcement policies of the Commission. Moreover,
pending the adoption of other systems for assuring effective consumer redress, actions by the FTC to obtain monetary relief will
at least provide recovery for some consumers who otherwise
might have gone uncompensated for losses they suffered as a result of acts or practices that violated the FTC Act.

